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memo w/ att.	From Kraft to The President (5pp.) re: Selection of SEC members/ enclosed in Hutcheson to Kraft 6/5/79	5/29/79	C

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
05 Jun 79

Alfred Kahn

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Frank Moore

FOR ACTION
FYI

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VICE PRESIDENT

JORDAN

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KRAFT

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POWELL

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WATSON

WEXLER

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ADAMS

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ARONSON

BUTLER

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CRUIKSHANK

FIRST LADY

HARDEN

HERNANDEZ

HUTCHESON

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MILLER

MOE

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PETTIGREW

PRESS

SANDERS

WARREN

WEDDINGTON

WISE

VOORDE

ADMIN. CONFIDEN.

CONFIDENTIAL

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EYES ONLY

call
main SD
we know
press
object

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALFRED E. KAHN *fred*

SUBJECT: A Joint Effort with Congress to Develop
a Short-Term Anti-Inflation Strategy

At Stu's suggestion, I have been having purely exploratory conversations with Congressional leaders to see what their reactions might be to some of the suggestions I made in the memorandum I gave you on June 1 on short-term anti-inflation strategy, to try to involve them cooperatively and to get their suggestions.

The Speaker has urged me to talk to the Democratic Policy and Steering Committee of the House tomorrow (Tuesday, June 5) at 2 p.m. It seems to me an excellent opportunity to convince them of the seriousness of the situation, and begin the process of involving them in the joint effort, that, I understand, you have endorsed.

I will of course make it clear that the ideas are mine, have not been endorsed by you, and are purely exploratory.

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for Preservation Purposes**

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C
/

June 1, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANNE WEXLER *AW*

In response to your request to see negative reactions to SALT, attached is a letter from Arthur H. Dean, former Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests in 1961, and Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1962. He was President Kennedy's negotiator.

It is the feeling of ACDA that Mr. Dean's public opposition could be especially damaging and they suggest that he might be influenced by John McCloy.

I know you will be having lunch with Mr. McCloy. Asking him to talk to Arthur Dean might be something you could ask him to do for you. We will be glad to provide complete answers to Mr. Dean's list of 19 questions (attached).

Attachment

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

6/29

125 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10004

May 21, 1979

Ms. Anne Wexler,
Assistant to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ms. Wexler:

This will acknowledge and thank you for your letter of May 10, 1979, which I have read with great interest.

I have not yet been able to obtain a copy of the text of the proposed SALT II treaty, its protocol, or the set of agreed principles for subsequent negotiations, and have had to rely upon the texts of various articles appearing in the newspapers.

For the reasons set forth by Senator Garn, Paul Nitze and Admiral Zumwalt in their appearance on "Meet the Press" on Sunday, May 19, and for the reasons set forth in the enclosed memorandum, I regret to say that I think the proposed treaty would permit the Soviet Union to achieve by 1985 or earlier dangerous superiority over the United States in nuclear combat and destructive power.

Sincerely yours,



Arthur H. Dean

SALT II

1. It does not provide equality in nuclear weapons capability. The reductions called for are reductions in the number of deployed launchers, not in missiles or warheads or in their effectiveness. While SALT II provides equality in the permitted number of launchers for strategic nuclear missiles, it will allow the Soviet Union to have within the permitted number more than 300 very large intercontinental missiles (ICBMs). The U.S.A. will have none. It will be impossible for the U.S.A. to have more than 550 MIRVed (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle) ICBM launchers at the time the treaty lapses in 1985, probably fewer. The Soviets almost certainly will have deployed, probably by 1982, the 820 permitted.
2. It will permit the Soviet Union to achieve, by 1985 or earlier, dangerous superiority over the United States in nuclear combat and destructive power.
3. That superiority can give the Soviet Union the power of political coercion over the United States and its allies in potential crisis situations.
4. The agreement will not reduce the risks of war. On the contrary, it can increase the risks of war if it reinforces the judgment that we are militarily stronger than the Soviet Union, but clearly we are not.
5. We will have, by 1985, no more than three warheads on each of our MIRVed ICBMs. The Soviet Union is permitted and is expected to have deployed up to 10 warheads on its SS-18s during the period of the treaty. The U.S.A. is permitted a similar missile but it is almost certain that it will not be able to deploy such a missile within that time period.
6. The Soviet BACKFIRE bombers, and comparable U.S. bombers, will be exempt from the limit on strategic launchers. The Soviet Union will have 300 to 400 BACKFIRE bombers by 1985, capable of refueling in Cuba and launching attacks on the U.S.A.. The U.S.A. will have no similar planes by 1985. President Carter scrapped our B-1s and our FB-111s, while capable of intercontinental attack, are less proficient and much less numerous than the Soviet planes.
7. Most worrisome is the problem of "crisis stability." Over the past 15 years it would not have profited either side to attack first. It would have required the use of more ICBMs by the attacking side than the attack could have destroyed.

By the early 1980s that situation will have changed. By that time the Soviet Union will be in a position to destroy 90 percent of our ICBMs with an expenditure of a fifth to a third of its ICBMs. This results, in part, from the increased accuracy and destructive power of the new Soviet missiles.

8. Even if one assumes the survival of most of our bombers on alert, and of our submarines at sea, the residue at our command after a Soviet initial attack would be strategically out-matched by the Soviet Union's war-making capability.
9. Reductions in SALT II are misleading. Although the number of Soviet launchers will decline from around 2,500 to 2,250 during the term of the treaty, the more significant indices of nuclear power will rise dramatically, particularly on the Soviet side, but on our side as well.
10. From the beginning of 1978 to the end of 1985, the number of Soviet warheads will have increased some three-fold; ours by half. The area destructive capabilities of Soviet weapons will have increased by a half; ours by a quarter. The capability of their weapons to knock out hardened targets, such as missile silos, will have increased ten-fold; if our cruise missiles, still under development, fulfill present expectations, ours will have increased only four-fold.
11. By 1985, under the limits of SALT II and taking into account the current programs of the two sides, it will be virtually impossible for the United States to avoid a situation in which our prompt counterforce capability against hardened military targets (silos; command, control and communication centers; storage depots; and shelters for leadership personnel, etc.) will be less than an eighth of that of the Soviet Union. This will be compounded by the fact that they will have double the number of hard targets, each, on the average, twice as hard as ours.
12. A bad agreement, even if wholly verifiable, which it is believed this is not, is still a bad agreement. However, the extent to which the terms of SALT II covering the strategically important factors are clearly defined and are verifiable remains very much in doubt.
13. It is said that the Soviet ruling group does not want a nuclear war. They believe that the best way to avoid a nuclear war and still achieve their objectives is to have overwhelming superiority. As Clausewitz puts it, the aggressor never wants war, he would prefer to enter your country unopposed.

14. It is a copybook principle in strategy that, in actual war, advantage tends to go to the side in a better position to raise the stakes by expanding the scope, duration or destructive intensity of warfare. By the same token, in a grave crisis short of war, the side better able to cope with the hypothetical consequences of raising the stakes has the advantage. The other side is the one under greater pressure to scramble for a peaceful way out.
15. The treaty excludes limitations on the new Soviet SS-20, an intermediate-range missile which could be modified to strike at the U.S.A.
16. We understate the tremendous advances in Soviet technology, especially in the space age and continue to assert that we are superior. True basic research has declined in the United States.
17. The U.S.A. has agreed not to provide cruise missile technology to our NATO allies.
18. As can be seen from the current state of the negotiation, difficult problems in definition are evident. What the range of a cruise missile is and how it is to be measured have proven to be conceptually difficult to define--not merely difficult to negotiate. What is the permitted "useful payload" of a "small" missile, i.e., exceeding what number of pounds of "useful payload" could cause it to be classed as an MLBM? The Soviets will not define "type", will not tell us how they measure useful payload, nor have they told us what they assess the useful payload of an SS-19 to be.
19. The U.S. contemplates deploying some 120 aircraft equipped with intermediate range ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles). The majority of these aircraft are planned to be B-52s; however, some type of transport aircraft carrying a larger number of ALCMs than does a B-52 is also being considered. If an aircraft is equipped to carry more than an agreed maximum number of ALCMs per aircraft, it will be counted as being an appropriate multiple of one "heavy bomber" under the 1,320 limit, depending upon the agreed maximum. To stay within the limit, we will have to phase out a small number of POSEIDON OR MINUTEMAN III launchers, and if we propose to deploy more than 120 ALCM-carrying planes, we will have to phase out additional POSEIDON or MINUTEMAN III launchers.

In such events as the Korean war, the Berlin blockade and the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. had the ultimate edge because of its strategic nuclear level. Under SALT II, the Soviet Union will be able to pick up the edge we have let slip away.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
05 Jun 79

Ed Sanders

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
June 1, 1979

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J

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: EDWARD SANDERS 

SUBJECT: Editorial of Support

Attached is a copy of an editorial from the Sentinel, which is the weekly of the Jewish community in Chicago. This editorial has been reprinted in Detroit, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and other cities.

The author of the editorial is Dr. Mark M. Krug, Professor of Education in History at the University of Chicago. He has volunteered to help you.

I have been in touch with Dr. Krug and he is about to write another editorial in the same vein. He is going to contact two or three other academicians and writers, who are of the same view. He and I will keep in touch.

Attachment:
Sentinel editorial

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

Editorial views of the news

*Dr Krug, You are
I overly generous to me, but
I thank you. We must
work together to achieve
the comprehensive peace in the
Middle East which will
give Israel permanent
security through strength.
This first treaty can
provide the foundation
for others.*
Jimmy
Carter

It's time to praise Carter



M. KRUG

The Wall Street Journal carried on March 28, an editorial entitled, "Peace Without Euphoria," on the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. It was a sober, penetrating and well-written editorial but its writer, or writers, accomplished a remarkable feat. They managed in that rather lengthy editorial not to mention the name of the architect of the treaty, President Jimmy Carter. It is indeed astonishing how unfair the newspapers and television commentators have been in not giving Carter the praise he is fully entitled to for helping Sadat and Begin to agree to peace between their two countries.

Regardless of what may happen in the future, the fact is that after 30 years of a state of war and four bloody conflicts, the largest, strongest and most prestigious Arab nation accorded Israel full recognition in exchange for the return of the Sinai and other undertakings concerning Palestinian Arabs. Five years ago no one would have predicted that this would or could happen. This signifies a drastic change for the better in the position of Israel in the Middle East.

Sadat and Begin stated on several occasions that without the untiring skillful efforts of President Carter, the treaty would not have become a reality. After the fall of Iran, it was generally assumed that the Camp David agreements would never be translated into a treaty because Sadat made demands for amendments to the treaty which were unacceptable to Israel.

At the time when all seemed lost, the American president courageously disregarded the advice of men of little faith in his own administration and in Congress and undertook to visit Cairo and Jerusalem in order to make a last ditch attempt to get the treaty signed. The difficulties he encountered are well

known. At the crucial stage of the negotiations when the failure of his mission was widely predicted, the bone-weary president of the mightiest country in the world persevered and went the extra mile to persuade Sadat and Begin to accept the compromises needed to resolve the remaining disputed issues.

Foolishly, some know-it-all columnists chided Carter for hurting the prestige of his office by his Cairo-Jerusalem shuttle but the president wisely decided not to dignify the attacks by a response. He had a job to do — to bring the beginning of peace to the Middle East and in the process to shore up the vital interests of the United States in a vital strategic area which was dangerously weakened by the revolution in Iran and by the expansion of Soviet power.

Those Americans who complain about the \$five billion that the treaty will cost the U.S., a cost that will be spread over three years, are foolhardy and shortsighted. This is a good bargain in exchange for the strengthening of two strong allies and for getting official or unofficial military bases and listening posts which may help to secure the Saudi oil so desperately needed for the survival of the United States and of Western Europe.

There are already many prophets of doom who, as Abba Eban recently said, cannot take yes for an answer. They are already telling us that the treaty will not work and that it will not bring peace. Luckily, Begin, Dayan, Weitzman and most of the people of Israel are full of joy, confidence and hope. We ought to share their confidence.

Presidents Carter and Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin have shown courage, great statesmanship and above all a dedication to peace.

They deserve our gratitude and support.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/4

C
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Mr. President:

Here is the letter
I mentioned - It
is being mailed
tomorrow to 5,000
Panama supporters
nationwide.

Done Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

P.S. The expenses are
being taken care of by
outside supporters - labor,
business and others.
mailgram draft coming later today.

When we were last in touch, we were near the end of a long and successful campaign to generate public support for the Panama Canal Treaties.

As you know, both treaties were ratified by the Senate last year. We feel now as we felt then that the treaties offer the best guarantee of our interests in an open and defensible Canal.

The time has now come for the House of Representatives to vote on legislation to implement the treaties. While not a perfect vehicle, H.R. 111, sponsored by Congressman John Murphy, will provide a framework to protect our interests and meet our international obligations under the treaties.

But treaty opponents have not given up the fight. They will propose a series of floor amendments designed to make the H.R. 111 unworkable.

Sponsors of the amendments argue that they will be saving U.S. taxpayers \$4 billion and ensuring U.S. possession of the Canal. These assertions are incorrect. In fact, a vote for the amendments will not be a vote for protecting U.S. interests in the Canal; it will be a vote directly contrary to U.S. interests.

In effect, the amendments would repudiate the treaties and thus risk the loss of all our legal rights to operate the Canal and to maintain forces in Panama after October 1st. Moreover, de facto repudiation poses the risk of closure, jeopardizing thousands of jobs in Atlantic and Gulf Coast ports, and interrupting the daily flow of one-half million barrels of Alaska North Slope oil bound for the oil-dependent Northeast. Worse, the amendments will expose the U.S. to charges of bad faith and will refuel allegations of American imperialism in Latin America.

The treaties have been negotiated, signed and ratified in accordance with our legal procedures. They are an accomplished and recognized fact in international law. We cannot retain our rights while at the same time refusing to honor our clear legal obligations. The question at hand, then, is not the validity of the treaties. At issue is nothing less than the security of the Canal and the welfare of American troops and civilians stationed in Panama until the year 2000. The proposed amendments to H.R. 111 will pose grave risks to both.

We believe it is imperative that the House enact H.R. 111 without amendments. The issue will be voted upon on or about June 12th. Time is running short. By our latest count, amendment supporters hold a 35-40 vote edge. We can only defeat such amendments with your help.

We have attached a list of key House members. We urge you to wire or call as many as possible without delay to urge that H.R. 111 be enacted without amendments. Your efforts represent our only chance to ensure that the bill will be approved intact. We know you share our sense of urgency on this issue. And we know that you will help. Thank you for your support.

Governor W. Averell Harriman
Former Co-Chairman
Committee of Americans for
the Canal Treaties

Senator Hugh Scott
Former Co-Chairman
Committee of Americans for
the Canal Treaties

Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz
Co-Negotiator, Panama Canal Treaties

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
Co-Negotiator, Panama Canal Treaties

KEY HOUSE MEMBERS

ANDREWS, Mark (R-N. Dakota)
ANTHONY, Beryl (D-Arkansas)
APPLEGATE, Douglas (D-Ohio)
BENJAMIN, Adam, Jr. (D-Indiana)
BENNETT, Charles (D-Florida)
BEREUTER, Douglas (R-Nebraska)
BOLAND, Edward (D-Massachusetts)
BRINKLEY, Jack (D-Georgia)
BUCHANAN, John Jr. (R-Alabama)
BYRON, Beverly (D-Maryland)
CLEVELAND, James (R-N. Hamp.)
CLINGER, William Jr. (R-Penn.)
CONNELLY, Brian (D-Massachusetts)
COUGHLIN, L. (R-Penn.)
COURTER, James (R-New Jersey)
DAVIS, Robert (R-Michigan)
DECKARD, H. Joel (R-Indiana)
DERRICK, Butler Jr. (D-S. Caro.)
DICKINSON, William (R-Alabama)
EARLY, Joseph (D-Massachusetts)
EDWARDS, Jack (R-Alabama)
EMERY, David (R-Maine)
ERTEL, Allen (D-Pennsylvania)
EVANS, Billy (D-Georgia)
FITHIAN, Floyd (D-Indiana)
FLORIO, James (D-New Jersey)
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JENRETTE, John Jr. (D-S. Caro.)
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LEACH, James (R-Iowa)
LLOYD, James (D-California)

LUJAN, Manuel Jr. (R-N. Mexico)
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SHUMWAY, Norman (R-California)
STANTON, Bill (R-Ohio)
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WHITLEY, Charles Sr. (D-N. Caro.)
YOUNG, Robert (D-Missouri)

WIRE: HONORABLE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

CALL: HOUSE SWITCHBOARD
(202) 225-3121

8:45 AM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANNE WEXLER *AW*

SUBJECT: Notable Participants in SALT II Briefing for
Scientists, June 5, 1979

You may want to recognize the attendance of Robert McNamara, Frank Borman (a former astronaut, now president of Eastern Airlines), and William Anders (a former astronaut, now Vice President of Research at General Electric Company) in your remarks before this group.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
June 4, 1979

BRIEFING ON SALT FOR SCIENTISTS

Tuesday, June 5, 1979
8:45 a.m. - 9:00 a.m.

FAMILY DINING ROOM

From: Anne Wexler *AW*
Frank Press *FP*

I. PURPOSE

To brief a group of prominent scientists on SALT and seek their active support in the ratification debate.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background

1. This will be the sixth group of national leaders to be briefed exclusively on SALT since the announcement of the summit. This group can play a particularly important role in educating the public and Congress on the technical aspects of SALT. Several may be willing to work quite hard for SALT; Carl Sagan flew in from Greece just for this meeting.
2. After breakfast the group will hear your remarks. They will then be given an overview of the SALT negotiations by Dr. Harold Brown followed by a detailed technical briefing by William Perry of the Defense Department. In addition, senior officials from the White House, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Defense Department will be present throughout the breakfast and briefing. (SEE ATTACHED AGENDA)

B. Participants (SEE ATTACHED LIST)

C. Press Plan

White House photographers and press pool will be present for the first five minutes of your remarks. The rest of the briefing is closed to press.

D. Talking Points (SEE ATTACHED)

In addition, you might recall the key role played by the scientific community on SALT I debate and ask for similar commitment.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SALT II BRIEFING FOR PROMINENT SCIENTISTS

Tuesday, June 5, 1979

8:00 A.M.

Family Dining Room

AGENDA

8:00 - 8:40 a.m.	Breakfast
8:40 - 8:45 a.m.	Opening Remarks, Frank Press
8:45 - 9:00 a.m.	President's Remarks
9:00 - 9:15 a.m.	Overview of SALT Negotiations Dr. Harold Brown
9:20 - 9:50 a.m.	Technical Details of the SALT II Treaty, Dr. William Perry
9:50 - 10:15 a.m.	Questions and Answers
10:15 - 10:30 a.m.	Closing Remarks and Discussion Frank Press and Anne Wexler

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ATTENDEES

SALT BRIEFING FOR SCIENTISTS

June 5, 1979

Philip Abelson
Science Magazine

Charles Adams
Raytheon Company

William A. Anders
General Electric Company
(former astronaut)

Frank Borman
Eastern Airlines
(former astronaut)

Lewis Branscomb
IBM Corporation

Paul Doty
JFK School of Government

Sidney Drell
Stanford Linear Accelerator

Lee Dubridge
Nobel Prize Winner

Daniel Fink
General Electric Company

James Fish
Bell Telephone Laboratories

Edwin Goldwasser
University of Illinois

Norman Hackerman
Rice University

Theodor Hueter
Honeywell Inc.

Franklin Long

Robert S. McNamara
World Bank

Robert Mulliken
University of Chicago

Herman Postma
Oak Ridge Laboratories

Jack Ruina
Massachusetts Instit. of Tech.

Isidor Rabi

David Ragone
University of Michigan

Carl Sagan
Cornell University

Glenn Seaborg
Lawrence Berkeley Lab.

John Slaughter
National Science Foundation

Guyford Stever

Alexander Tachmindji
Mitre Corporation

James Van Allen
University of Iowa

Alvin Weinberg
Oak Ridge Assoc. Universities

Albert Wheelon
Hughes Aircraft

Ernest Wilkins
EG & G Idaho, Inc.

Charles Zemach
Los Alamos Scientific Lab.

James Rouse
Rouse Construction

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

BRIEFING ON SALT FOR SCIENTISTS

Tuesday, June 5, 1979

8:45 a.m. - 9:00 a.m.

FAMILY DINING ROOM

We believe you should talk along the lines of your remarks to the retailers. Here are some suggested points to cover, which we've worked up with Rick Hertzberg of Jerry Rafshoon's office:

1. The SALT II treaty was hammered out by the sustained work of three Administrations: President Nixon's, President Ford's, and yours. It builds on the work of every American President since the end of World War II.

2. SALT must be examined realistically. It is not a panacea. It will not end the arms race. It is a supplement -- not a substitute -- for a strong national defense. But it is a major step in the long, historic process of bringing nuclear weapons under rational control.

3. SALT II is based on self-interest, ours and the Soviet Union's. Although the competition between us will continue as far into the future as anyone can see, we share a mutual interest in survival and in steering our competition away from its most dangerous element, an uncontrolled strategic nuclear arms race.

4. SALT II is not based on trust. The treaty will be adequately verifiable by our own national technical means of verification. In addition, it is in the interest of the Soviet Union to abide by this treaty. Despite predictions to the contrary, the Soviets have observed the terms of the SALT I treaty.

5. Whether or not the treaty is ratified, we must be able to make accurate assessments of Soviet capabilities. But SALT II will make this task much easier -- not only because the treaty forbids concealment measures and interference with means of verification, but also because the treaty gives us basic standards with which we can compare the information we derive independently from our satellites and other methods.

6. The details of ICBMs and SLBMs, throwweight and yield and all the rest are important. It was largely because of these details that the treaty took seven years to negotiate. But these details should not blind us to the real significance of the treaty as a contribution to stability, security and peace.

7. The treaty must be judged on its merits, but we must consider the consequences of rejection:

--radical departure from the process of arms control that began with the atmospheric test ban and SALT I and will continue with SALT III and a comprehensive test ban;

--heightened possibility of confrontation in each local crisis;

--triggering an expensive, dangerous race for a nuclear superiority that each side has the means and will to prevent the other from attaining, with a loss of security for both;

--calling into question our ability to manage a stable East-West relationship, thus undermining our leadership of the Western alliance;

--implications for nuclear proliferation;

--gravely compromising our Nation's position as a leader in the search for peace.

8. Importance of the coming debate; solicitation of support. Recall key role played by scientific community in public debate on SALT I accords and ask for similar commitment today.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

05 Jun 79

Zbig Brzezinski

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you
for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Jim McIntyre

2495~



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/	MCINTYRE
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	HARRIS
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	MARSHALL
	SCHLESINGER
	STRAUSS
	VANCE

	ARONSON
	BUTLER
	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	CRUIKSHANK
	FIRST LADY
	HARDEN
	HERNANDEZ
	HUTCHESON
	KAHN
	LINDER
	MARTIN
	MILLER
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	VOORDE
	ADMIN. CONFIDEN.
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

*zbrs -
info
J*

To: Randy Jayne

Subj: Additional Points on PL 480 and AID

(1) PL 480. Despite likely increases in LDC food import needs, the AID missions have paid little attention to the longer-term need for PL 480 in terms of either (a) the country's likely food and foreign exchange deficit or (b) the relationship of the PL 480 and dollar assistance programs. Symptomatic of this lack of attention is the fact that the aggregate of Title I requests for 1984 is roughly \$800 million (approximately the current level) compared with the long-range planning guidance for that year of \$1,300 million.

(2) AID. A number of the CDSS documents were submitted to Washington with indications of strong reservations about the level of the planning guidance and the wisdom of communicating that guidance to the recipient government. A few quotes may be useful:

(a) India. "The Mission rejects this level [\$1.0 billion in 1985] as being politically unrealistic for both governments. USAID instead has projected an optimistic program [of \$560 million] but one which we believe is capable of being carried out.... India's acknowledged competence, the multi-donor nature of assistance to India, and the nature of Indo-U.S. bilateral relationships make inappropriate a disproportionately massive or intensive American assistance program."

(b) Nepal. "I [Amb. Heck] am also concerned about one aspect of the planning allocation figures that we are using in our strategy. As the paper sets forth, we consider the figure of \$71 million for 1985 projected by Washington as too large.... USAID/Nepal believes it can effectively implement a program of the magnitude proposed [\$35 million].... I am concerned that the figures may prove misleading to the GON, which is bound to learn of them. As you know, the U.S. had decided not to allocate the funds to Nepal that it had earlier advised the GON and other donors it was prepared to provide. These changes are not helpful in maintaining the credibility of our commitment to one of the poorest of the poor countries."

(c) Sri Lanka. "In general, I [Amb. Wriggins] approve the strategy.... [But] given the very real constraints on both the Sri Lankan and American sides, the Indicative Planning Figure of \$93 million for Sri Lanka in 1985 is, in my judgment, unrealistic. To attain this level would require either a radical improvement in the Government of Sri Lanka's management and implementation capabilities or a modification of disparate guidance from Washington."

(d) Thailand. "The CDSS lays out a sound strategy to focus our efforts. Frankly, I [Amb. Abramowitz] am skeptical that anywhere near the level of resources upon which the CDSS is predicated will be forthcoming. I, therefore, question the utility of USAID expending so much of its time and energy in preparing this document. Certainly, our modest but useful program does not require all this huffing and puffing. More importantly, I question the wisdom of engaging in extensive dialogue with the Thai Government on their development concerns and priorities if this is, as I suspect, but another paper exercise."

*Good
Comment*

(e) Bangladesh "AID MISSION DIRECTOR" SKEPTICAL

Ruta

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
05 Jun 79

Ed Sanders

The attached was returned
in the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

2491



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
June 4, 1979

*I thanked
him
J*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: EDWARD SANDERS *Ed*

SUBJECT: Comments by Ted Mann, Chairman, Conference
of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations

I thought you would be interested in the attached article. Ted Mann repeated most of this in a speech last Wednesday night, and the interview and the speech have received wide circulation in the Jewish press

I think that it might be a good idea for you to put in a telephone call to Ted. His numbers are (215) 732-3120 (office); and (215) 896-7470 (home).

Attachment:
article

cc: Vice President Mondale
Hamilton Jordan

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Carter's record is hard to beat, Mann asserts

By David Gross
Special to The Jewish Week
from the Philadelphia Jewish Exponent

PHILADELPHIA—By his own reckoning, Ted Mann has logged some 200,000 miles since assuming the chairmanship of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations a year ago.

As he begins his second year in office, the Philadelphia lawyer and veteran Jewish leader can look forward to many more miles of travel to the power centers of New York, Washington, Jerusalem and now Cairo.

Mann visited the JEWISH EXPONENT to share his thoughts on some of the current

issues facing the Jewish community. He had recently returned from attending the formal exchange of treaty documents between Egypt and Israel at Umm Kashiba in the Sinai and from a series of meetings with senior U.S. officials.

"It is most important," Mann began, "that when American Jews count up the mistakes of the Carter Administration and there are mistakes and they should be counted—they do not lose sight of the Administration's positive accomplishments, and they are impressive. This Administration has been fantastic on almost every item on the Jewish agenda, except for the West Bank and East Jerusalem."

"There is a tremendous concern in the Jewish community over the Palestine Liberation Organization and its relation to the U.S.," Mann continued. "Also over the Administration's view that East Jerusalem, or part of it, could or should be under Arab sovereignty. These are immense issues that indicate different views on Israel's security requirements than the views of most Jews."

Noting that "it isn't easy to say this to American Jews because, it seems, they just don't want to hear it," Mann nevertheless stated emphatically, "If I had to write a script on what an Administration could do, this one would be hard to beat."

Mann praised the Carter Administration's

efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry, stressing that the U.S. was acting on human rights principles, not merely to secure Jewish votes. He also commended the Administration's work for the beleaguered Jewish communities in Argentina and Iran. "I can't think of anything they could do and haven't done," he said.

Turning specifically to the situation in Iran, Mann stated that no one can predict what is going to happen there. He said the best intelligence—both American and Israeli—indicates that the Islamic courts are on their own and that the Ayatollah Khomeini only finds out what they have done after it happens.

"The Administration and the Jewish community here are faced with a very difficult decision," Mann said, "Iranian Jewry is being held hostage and we must weigh the risks between remaining silent and raising

our voices in protest. We did protest the recent execution of Jewish leader Habib Elkannan. The Ayatollah then met with a delegation of Iranian Jews and limited the power of the Islamic courts. This indicates that the risk of keeping quiet is greater than the risk of speaking out."

Mann also summed up the current situation regarding the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which links U.S.-Soviet trade to the Soviet Union's emigration policy. "No one has suggested that Jackson-Vanik be repealed," he stressed. "Some senators have suggested it be amended but they have no Administration support. Jackson-Vanik itself contains a waiver provision and that is what the current discussion involves—whether the waiver clause should be invoked, but under what conditions Jackson-Vanik should be waived."

Most Jewish groups, he noted are seeking

to continue using Jackson-Vanik to aid Soviet Jews. They see it as a lever to pry more Jews—especially refuseniks and "Prisoners of Conscience"—out of the Soviet Union, as well as to encourage the Soviets to regularize their emigration procedures. Some of this had already happened, Mann said, particularly in the last eight months. He pointed to the dramatic increase in immigration figures and the recent release of prisoners and refuseniks.

Prophet's mantle

Here Mann dared assume the prophet's mantle. "Within 60 days," he confidently predicted, "the Jackson-Vanik Amendment will be waived for 12 months and the Soviet Union will be granted 'most-favored-nation' status. Will that decision to waive Jackson-Vanik be a wise one? Even Mann refused to predict. "Ask me next year at this time," he replied.

Theodore Mann, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, was the speaker at the annual election meeting of the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington last night (Wednesday)

THE JEWISH WEEK

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Washington, D.C.

May 31-June 6, 1979

6-5-79

6/5/79
Breakfast Briefing on SALT for
Community Leaders

SALT = HISTORY
US SECURITY
WORLD PEACE
CONTROL NUKES
BALANCED DEFENSE
NON-PROLIF
NO TRUST
VERIFIABLE
ALLIES
TRENDS
PROCESS

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McNAMARA - BORMAN - Wm ANDERSON

meeting with Congressmen
Al-Ullman and Charles Rangel
6/5/79

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6-5-79

Ullman-Rangel

HCC

Competition - HMO's

Catastrophic - 11m → M'caid

All < 55% poverty

Fed admin M'caid, Opt-out

Announce 6/12 Long AU 6/18

W&M Mun Bonds → WPT → HCC

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/5/79

Stu Eizenstat.
Jack Watson

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Phil Wise
Fran Voorde

2499

FOR ACTION
FYI

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
✓	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
	NO DEADLINE
	LAST DAY FOR ACTION

	VICE PRESIDENT
	JORDAN
✓	EIZENSTAT
	KRAFT
	LIPSHUTZ
	MOORE
	POWELL
	RAF SHOON
✓	WATSON
	WEXLER
	BRZEZINSKI
	MCINTYRE
	SCHULTZE
	ADAMS
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	CALIFANO
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	SCHLESINGER
	STRAUSS
	VANCE

	ARONSON
	BUTLER
	H. CARTER
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	FIRST LADY
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	HERNANDEZ
	HUTCHESON
	KAHN
	LINDER
	MARTIN
	MILLER
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✓	WISE
✓	VOORDE
	ADMIN. CONFIDEN.
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

before
sending out -
did I staff to
phil ?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 30, 1979

Jack
Stu

J

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STUART EIZENSTAT *Stu*
JACK WATSON *Jack*

SUBJECT: Proposed Meetings with the "Human Resources" Members of Your Cabinet

We think your idea for regular meetings with the Cabinet Secretaries who concentrate on "human resources" problems is a good one. As you know, fairly or unfairly, many of the constituencies which administer, or are affected by, social services for the unemployed, the handicapped, the poor, the elderly, the disadvantaged, etc. feel that this Administration has not demonstrated the kind of commitment and concern for those areas that they deserve. Regular meetings with the Cabinet Members who have the major responsibilities for dealing with the various "vulnerable populations" in the country would not only help demonstrate your personal interest in dealing with the problems of those people, it would also give you a better sense of the problems and priorities in those areas.

We think your idea about a breakfast meeting is particularly good because it lends a personal touch that could not be duplicated by a meeting in the Cabinet Room.

There are two ways in which such breakfasts might be organized.

- oh* → (1) You could meet regularly (e.g., every other Tuesday morning) with a core group of Cabinet Secretaries -- such as HEW, HUD and Labor -- to discuss particular human resources problems, inviting other Cabinet Secretaries or agency heads to join you, as the agenda required it (e.g., Community Services Administration, ACTION, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, etc.).

Probably not →

You might also include at such breakfasts from time to time the heads of various key sub-cabinet agencies, such as the Administration on Aging,

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LEAA, the Rehabilitation Services Administration, the Administration for Native Americans, CETA, etc. Not only would those people (who actually manage the programs) be able to give you a different perspective than the Cabinet Secretaries, the simple fact of your having a "working breakfast" with them would have major and very positive reverberations in both the federal bureaucracies involved, and in the constituencies that they serve.

In fact, because so much of our problem in this area is a perceptual one, it might also be a good idea to include at some of the breakfast meetings one or two responsible and well-informed people from outside the government. Here again, the symbolic impact of your talking privately and informally with knowledgeable people from the outside about the problems of the handicapped, minority youth, the elderly, etc. would be very great, and, we think, very constructive.

- (2) Alternatively, you might institute a schedule of regular breakfast meetings on various human resources problems, but not have the same core group of Cabinet Secretaries present at every session. Under this approach, particular problems or areas would be selected for discussion at a given breakfast, and you would invite only the appropriate Cabinet and other people to attend.

Whatever approach you choose, we think that the breakfast meetings should be limited to one hour, and that the agenda should be discussed with the participants beforehand, so that everyone will be fully prepared to give you their best ideas and observations in the most concise way.

As the first step, we suggest that you invite Secretaries Califano, Harris and Marshall to breakfast sometime soon for an informal discussion of this whole subject. You could express your interest in improving and expanding your dialogue with them (and theirs with each other) on a range of priority, interrelated human resources issues and solicit their advice about how best to go about doing so.

If you approve, we will check with Phil Wise and set a time for a breakfast meeting with the three Secretaries.

C

SIGNATURE TAB

This sheet will precede the signature page in assembled correspondence.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Frank Moore *F. M.*

SUBJECT: Call to Governor Graham about Department of
Education Legislation

Our Department of Education legislation is scheduled for the Rules Committee next Tuesday and House floor action the following day.

Although the preliminary vote count shows a margin in favor of the bill, the trend is negative. This may be a close vote. The potential opposition of Congressmen Brademas and Simon because of the amendment described below may result in defeat.

A very controversial amendment was attached to the bill in the House Committee by Dante Fascell of Florida. This amendment gives the Secretary of Education authority to waive Federal requirements regarding the organization at the State level of the Department's programs. The purpose of the amendment is to enable the State of Florida to disregard a provision in the Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) Act requiring that a single and separate office within the Department of Human Services operate the program. (VR was added to the Department of Education bill in the House Committee.) The courts have held that Florida's decentralized, integrated district office system does not meet this requirement of the VR Act. If nothing happens before October 1, they will lose funding or be forced to turn over the program to a private nonprofit organization.

Congressman Brademas, who until this year chaired the subcommittee that authorizes VR, and Florida have been engaged in a heated, emotional battle over this issue for several years. Governor Graham and the Florida legislative leadership believe that this amendment to the Department of Education bill is their best opportunity to solve the problem. The National Governors Association favors the waiver concept and is also behind this amendment. Brademas views this as a back door effort, since the Education and Labor Committee should properly have jurisdiction.

Brademas and Paul Simon (new chairman of the VR authorizing committee) and the handicapped groups will mobilize opposition to the Department of Education bill unless the Fascell waiver amendment is dropped.

Jim McIntyre and I recommend that you call Governor Graham to explain the seriousness of the problem that this amendment is causing for the bill. (Graham already has a call in to you.) Congressmen Brademas and Simon have agreed that if the amendment can be dropped quietly from the Department of Education bill, they would commit in writing to a process for resolving the issue fairly in the Education and Labor Committee including:

1. Subcommittee hearings to be completed by a date certain some of which could take place in Florida.
2. Subcommittee mark up by a date certain to ensure a vote.
3. Full Committee hearings by Chairman Perkins who has agreed to be helpful on this matter.

OMB and HEW fully support the waiver concept. We must assure Graham that we will strongly support a waiver bill in the Education and Labor Committee. Graham supports the Department of Education bill (in fact he was the only Governor to testify on our behalf) and may not insist on the Fascell amendment to this bill if he is convinced that it would cost the Administration an important victory. Of course, if the Department of Education bill is defeated because of opposition to the waiver, then we all lose. Further, Brademas would be under no obligation in that case to hold hearings.

You will be travelling to Indiana this weekend with Brademas. If Governor Graham will go along with this course of action, the next step would be a discussion between Brademas, Simon and Fascell to seal the arrangement.

Agree _____

Disagree _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
05 Jun 79


Secretary Califano

The attached was returned
in the President's outbox
today and is forwarded to
you for appropriate handing.

Rick Hutcheson

Jody Powell

2201



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


6/5/79

TO: RICK COTTON
FROM: RICK HUTCHESON
SUBJECT: Attached Memo



Pursuant to Secretary Califano's suggestion, Jody Powell plans to issue this decision from the White House. Please have your press office coordinate with Jody on that. Thanks.

cc: Jody Powell





THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20201

MAY 22 1979

*Joe:
Let's do more
of this
J*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As you know, one of the most controversial provisions of the Title IX sex discrimination regulations we inherited deals with dress and personal appearance codes in schools. Prompted by several ludicrous situations around the country in which we had to get involved in local dress codes and rules concerning hair length, the Department published a Notice in the Federal Register last Winter indicating our intention to repeal that portion of the Title IX regulation.

The Department received less than 50 comments, approximately half of which supported our pending action and the other half wanting the Federal Government to retain supervision of local school dress codes and personal appearance requirements.

I would like to now publish a final regulation which would return responsibility for dress codes and hair length to the local level where these issues are best handled.

Before this change can become effective, I am required by law to have it approved by you and submitted to the Congress for a 45-day review period. Attached at Tab A is the final rule for your approval. Once I hear from you I will have the final regulation published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.

We have previously announced this and it was very well received. You might wish to announce your approval from the White House.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

approve disapprove
J

ID 792201

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DATE: 23 MAY 79

FOR ACTION: JODY POWELL

JERRY RAFSHOON

need to create this

Lipshutz - vid comment

INFO ONLY: THE VICE PRESIDENT

STU EIZENSTAT

JACK WATSON

JIM MCINTYRE

for summary

SUBJECT: CALIFANO MEMO RE FEDERAL REGULATION RE DRESS CODES

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+++++
+ RESPONSE DUE TO RICK HUTCHESON STAFF SECRETARY (456-7052) +
+ BY: 1200 PM FRIDAY 25 MAY 79 +
+++++

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ACTION REQUESTED: YOUR COMMENTS

STAFF RESPONSE: () I CONCUR. () NO COMMENT. () HOLD.

PLEASE NOTE OTHER COMMENTS BELOW:

ID

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DATE: 23 MAY 79

FOR ACTION: JODY POWELL

JERRY RAFSHOON

*Rex - where this
is now.
JRP*

INFO ONLY: THE VICE PRESIDENT

STU ELZENSTAT

JACK WATSON

JIM MCINTYRE

SUBJECT: CALIFANO MEMO RE FEDERAL REGULATION RE DRESS CODES

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+++++
+ RESPONSE DUE TO RICK HUTCHESON STAFF SECRETARY (456-7052) +
+ BY: 1200 PM FRIDAY 25 MAY 79 +
+++++

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ACTION REQUESTED: YOUR COMMENTS

STAFF RESPONSE: () I CONCUR. () NO COMMENT. () HOLD.

PLEASE NOTE OTHER COMMENTS BELOW:

Rick---

Jody's comment is that yes, we would like to announce the President's approval from here, and that we will contact the HEW public information office for any additional details necessary to make a brief announcement.

Rex

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


05 Jun 79

Frank Moore

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today and is forwarded to
you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

2489



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WASHINGTON

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6/11/74

Frank
J

CONGRESSIONAL TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Congressman Jack Murphy

DATE: As soon as possible.

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RECOMMENDED-
BY: Frank Moore *F.M.*

PURPOSE: To make sure that he will continue to help us pass good implementing legislation despite the Hearings he is planning this week about Panamanian support for the Sandinistas.

BACKGROUND: Jack Murphy appears to have strayed from the reservation, possibly allowing his affection for Somoza to supersede his commitment to help pass Panama implementing legislation. ~~Murphy~~ has announced that he will hold two days of hearings beginning Wednesday to get to the bottom of Panamanian support for the Sandinista movement. In doing so, he is directly linking the implementing legislation to this issue in a way that can only create major problems just before we bring the bill up on the floor.

We are exploring the possibility that the leadership will want to weigh in with Murphy on this matter, but even if he receives pressure from this direction, Murphy seems too far committed to cancel his hearing. What we hope to accomplish is to soften him up to the point where he will be willing to concede that it would not be in our national interest to tie the fate of the implementing legislation to Panama's Nicaragua policy. He may also be willing to cooperate in not trying to embarrass our witnesses and in holding closed Committee sessions for the most sensitive information. Most importantly, we want Murphy to manage the implementing legislation successfully when it reaches the House floor the following week.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

- Jack, I am aware of your plans to hold hearings on Panama's support for the Sandinista movement. This is certainly a matter of legitimate interest to the Congress, but I am gravely concerned over what I see as an effort to link this matter to the fate of the Panama Canal implementing legislation.
- Panama may be engaged in activities we cannot always endorse. They see the Nicaragua problem in the regional context and they are concerned, as are we, over the radicalization of many countries in their area. Nevertheless, to permit this separate problem to endanger our effective use of the Panama Canal would only further radicalize the region and permit the Cubans to exploit the resultant anti-American sentiment.
- Jack, I sincerely hope that your earlier commitment to me to help us pass good implementing legislation is still valid. I know of your strong views about the Nicaragua situation, but we simply must keep these issues on separate tracks. I need your leadership on this matter, Jack. We cannot allow the situation in Nicaragua to cause the Panama Canal to shut down. Will you continue to help us?

DATE OF SUBMISSION: June 4, 1979

Think we have legislation in hand. Some members are still confused, thinking they can block treaty implementation. Clear majority - I think hold to 6/12 date - do not delay Amer Legion pulled off - Martha troubled Nicaragua hearing - separated from Panama treaty - Nicaragua Limited hearing - flying in to Cuban planes flying in to Panama blatantly"