

11/8/79 [1]

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10:30 AM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 7, 1979

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GRETCHEN POSTON

SUBJECT: THE VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF IRELAND AND
MRS. LYNCH ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1979

Attached are the scenarios for the visit indicated above.

cc: Rick Hutcheson
Phil Wise
Dale Leibach

Jane Fenderson
Paul Costello
Ambassador Valdez
Ken Hays

Rex Scouten
Military Aides
Bob Mitchell
Nancy Willing
Billie Shaddix
Lt. Brooks
Sgt. Oleksia
Sgt. Davis

Chuck Brewster

Kit Dobbelle
Mary Hoyt

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

ON THE OCCASION OF
THE VISIT OF
THE PRIME MINISTER OF IRELAND
AND MRS. LYNCH

ARRIVAL

10:00 AM Welcoming and Official Parties arrive White House, South Lawn.

10:20 AM Official Party preceding the Prime Minister arrives White House, and takes positions on South Lawn.

10:27 AM THE PRESIDENT arrive Diplomatic Reception Room.

10:29 AM THE PRESIDENT is announced, and enters grounds to edge of red carpet.

(Music - "Man of the Hour")

10:30 AM The motorcade carrying the Prime Minister and Mrs. Lynch arrives - fanfare. Official introductions.

THE PRINCIPALS (3) proceed onto platform and into positions for honors.

(Irish National Anthem)
(U.S. National Anthem)
(19-gun salute)

THE PRESIDENT and the Prime Minister descend platform for Inspection of Troops. Return to platform for remarks.

(All PRINCIPALS into new positions - see attached.)

Following remarks, PRINCIPALS return to positions facing south as Commander of Troops closes ceremony.

ALL PRINCIPALS descend platform, ascend stairs to South Portico Balcony for press photo session. Continue into Blue Room for receiving line.


11:00 AM Coffee is served in Blue Room.

11:15 AM THE PRESIDENT and the Prime Minister depart State floor for Oval Office.

Mrs. Lynch is escorted to Blair House.

SOUTH LAWN

SOUTH LAWN



DIPLOMATIC ENTRANCE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR: THE PRESIDENT AND
FROM: GRETCHEN POSTON *GP*
SUBJECT: RAIN PLAN - ARRIVAL CEREMONY
VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF IRELAND & MRS. LYNCH
NOVEMBER 8, 1979

In the event of rain, the Prime Minister and Mrs. Lynch will arrive at the North Portico. Following your greeting at the North Portico, all three should proceed down the Cross Hall and into the East Room.

As you enter (pausing for the announcements) the platform will be directly in front of you, and the official parties will be on your right. On the platform, please note that your positions will be different from those at an outside ceremony. The diagram below shows your positions on the platform, facing the Cross Hall and press pens.

Coffee after the ceremony will be held in the Blue Room, and all three Principals should depart the East Room via the Cross Hall, and enter the Blue Room from the Cross Hall.

PRESS

PRESS

LECTERN

1 2 3

Official
Parties

- 1 - Mrs. Lynch
- 2 - THE PRESIDENT
- 3 - The Prime Minister

2:00 PM

Frank
J

MEETING WITH SENATOR HOWELL HEFLIN

Thursday, November 8, 1979
2:00 pm (20 minutes)
The Oval Office

From: Frank Moore *FM/m*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss SALT

II. PERSONAL INFORMATION, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Personal Information:

Wife's Name: Elizabeth Ann

Children: Tom

Home Town: Tuscumbia, Alabama

Committee Assignments:

Committee on Judiciary (10)
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (10)
Select Committee on Ethics, Chairman

B. Participants: Senator Howell Heflin (D-Alabama)

C. Press Arrangements: White House photographer

III. BACKGROUND

A. SALT Concerns: Although we are carrying Heflin as undecided, he has become increasingly negative over the last weeks. When he met with the Vice President in June, Heflin was particularly concerned about Backfires, verification, the strength of our nuclear deterrent, and our capability and willingness to respond to a situation where the Soviets were caught cheating. In a letter to his constituents, he said he would favor on-site inspections. In August at a

C. Additional Issues and Personal Information:

Senator Heflin is the most popular sitting politician in Alabama. His political base is sound, having inherited Jim Allen's old supporters and combined them with his own. Due to a quirk, Heflin, who is 20 years older than Donald Stewart, is the junior Senator. Stewart, the senior Senator, took office immediately after winning the November, 1978 election, but because he is only filling the unexpired two years of Jim Allen's term, he must run for reelection in 1980.

Senator Heflin is conservative and business-oriented. His vote is an elusive one for us on most issues. Having spent most of his adult life as a judge, Howell Heflin does not understand the legislative process. Consequently, he pursues issues despite long legislative odds--examples are his opposition to the nomination of Bob Clemente to the TVA Board, and his insistence on pushing the helicopter consolidation proposal (despite a lopsided loss in the House and a hopeless vote count for the Senate.) The latter puts us in a rather awkward situation because only an all out effort on our part would get us close and, if we won, it would be by the slightest margin in the Senate. The House conferees would undoubtedly resist mightily (due to the large House vote against our position.) In short, this is not an issue that either we or Heflin should use any political capital on this year.

Says "Leaning toward" support. Will study & check with me if a problem arises. I described the geo-political aspects of SACT.

J

Town Meeting in Alabama, he said that the burden of proof was on the proponents of the Treaty to show that the U.S. will not end up inferior to the Soviets. "If they can't prove that to me, I won't be for it."

Recently we have gotten word that he is listening to Jackson. When a Union group went to see him about SALT, he replied with Jackson-type arguments to what he said was the Administration line.

B. Political Concerns:

- A lot of outreach work has been done in the state, and a recent Hart poll shows that voters are evenly divided on SALT. His principal staffer, who is pro-SALT, has been telling Heflin that he has four years to recover from a pro-SALT vote, and that he can cover himself politically by telling his constituents that his concerns about verification and defense have been taken care of.
- Heflin will have an enormous impact on how Senator Stewart will ultimately vote. Stewart is substantially pro-SALT, but reelection politics have pushed him into becoming a SALT critic. Heflin becomes, therefore, doubly important.
- We are trying to work with Senator Sparkman who has a good deal of influence with Heflin. Sparkman will be in Washington for the first time since his retirement next week. He is scheduled to see you briefly on SALT, and then we hope he will meet with Heflin.
- Heflin has been supporting TV coverage of the SALT debate and has gotten a lot of mileage out of that at home.

2:00 p.m.

November 8, 1979

C
/

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Frank Moore *FM.*

RE: Senator Heflin

Senator Heflin has told me that he prefers to remain neutral in the Presidential race because Kennedy is Chairman of the Judiciary Committee on which he sits. Alabama is becoming more and more critical all the time and you should tell him that you hope that when you need his help in Alabama he will be ready to let his people help.

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

08 Nov 79

FOR THE RECORD:

FRANK MOORE RECEIVED A COPY OF
THE ATTACHED.

3:15 PM

MEETING WITH SNEATOR DANIEL MOYNIHAN

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

Thursday, November 8, 1979
3:15 pm (20 minutes)
The Oval Office

From Frank Moore *FM/BB*

*Frank -
Good meeting.
His SALT III
amendment is
important to him, but
he's flexible on
details*
J

I. PURPOSE

To discuss SALT

II. PERSONAL INFORMATION, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS ARRANGEMENT,
AND BACKGROUND

A. Personal Information: Elizabeth (Liz)

Children: Timothy Patrick, Maura Ruseli
John McCloskey

Home Town: Oneonta, New York

Committee Assignments:

- Committee on the Budget (11)
- Committee on Environment and Public Works (8)
- Committee on Finance (9)
- Select Committee on Intelligence (5)

B. Participants: Senator Daniel Moynihan

C. Press Arrangements: White House photographer

III. BACKGROUND

A. SALT Concerns: He does not believe that the Treaty goes far enough in limiting nuclear weapons. In the last six weeks he has made three speeches (Tab A) the thrust of which are basically the same: the SALT debate is not about limiting arms, is instead a rearmament debate. In order to get U.S. military support for the talks, the Administration accepts corresponding increases in U.S. nuclear forces. U.S. behavior in nuclear weapons has become basically imitative of Soviet behavior because we have accepted the Soviet definition of "arms control." He believes that you have contributed to this escalation and have diminished the chances for serious reductions in SALT III by your commitment to

Senator Byrd to go forward with the cruise missile programs and the MX when the Protocol expires.

Therefore, he is working on language for an understanding/reservation requiring deep cuts after 1985 and abrogating the Treaty if such cuts are not negotiated by the end of 1981. (Cranston is working with him to eliminate the termination aspect.)

His attitudes about defense spending are ambiguous. He voted for the 3% and the 5% defense increase but said increases should not be at the expense of social programs. He is bothered by our promise to increase defense spending just to get SALT ratified, but at the same time castigates this and past Administrations for not recognizing and keeping pace with Soviet military expansion. He is worried about the MX counterforce capability and concerned with our resolve in making the Soviets comply with SALT limits.

- B. Political Concerns: We believe he wants to vote for the Treaty and that most of his constituents want him to. His statements include a lot of rhetoric which satisfies his personal commitments to Jackson, as well as providing him a platform to sound his anti-Soviet drum. Moynihan will have an impact on many of his colleagues who respect his foreign policy background.
- C. Additional Issues and Personal Information:
Please refer to Dan Tate's memo to you on Moynihan.

FROM THE OFFICE OF

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

New York

For Release 10:15 am
Monday, AM
September 24, 1979

Contact: Tim Russert
Vicki Bear
202/224-4451

SALT II

STATEMENT BY SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN (D., N.Y.)

before the

United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Monday, September 24, 1979 at 10:15 a.m.

I thank the Committee for its courtesy in allowing me the opportunity to offer some thoughts about the SALT II treaty. The Committee has, through its exhaustive examination of the matter, established a record which will not only inform the Senate's debate, but set a standard for it.

I shall not speak from the perspective of the expert, but the presence of experts in this discussion will be my starting point. For there is no area of public policy which has been so exclusively the realm of the scientific and intellectual community as arms control has been. Our notions about strategic weapons have been created by scientists -- both physical and political -- and the continuity within the "arms control community" has been striking. It is therefore appropriate to speak of a kind of "intellectual crisis" in arms control which the SALT negotiations have, in my view, come to create.

I use the phrase "intellectual crisis" to describe the following phenomenon: it appears that the American government is abandoning the strategic doctrine which guided it through ten years of SALT negotiations, without having propounded any new clear and consistent doctrine to replace it. I perceive, in fact, a confusion in this realm which hovers over the entire SALT ratification proceeding.

For we must understand that everything we have done in the matter of strategic arms limitation has been governed by ideas, indeed, by a doctrine. The SALT talks themselves were thought up by Americans and were, from the beginning, designed to secure Soviet agreement -- in fact and in principle -- to American ways of thinking and doing about nuclear weapons.

American strategic nuclear doctrine is one of the most important and most influential of intellectual constructs in this century. It is, in one sense, a tribute to the willingness of the best minds among us to engage the awesome destructive potential of nuclear weapons. And yet, I would submit that, today, we must begin to put some pressure on those ideas, and therefore on the larger SALT process which those ideas brought into being.

We sought, with SALT, to achieve the creation of nuclear forces in our two countries which would meet criteria for safety and stability defined by our doctrine, a doctrine often called "assured destruction." There were, in essence, two requirements: the first, that civilian populations remain vulnerable to nuclear attack, so that neither nation would initiate a nuclear exchange at the risk of the "hostages" it had given up; the second, that the strategic forces of both countries remain invulnerable to attack, so that the ability to strike back in the event of attack would never be called into question.

Now, from the point of view of this conception, the treaty of 1972 which banned the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defenses, should have indicated acceptance of the "assured destruction" notion. Without defenses, one would surely perceive the possibility of real restraints, if not major reductions, on offensive forces. And, one would also have predicted that neither country would seek to increase the vulnerability of the other's strategic forces.

On these accounts, the history of SALT since 1969 is not what American strategic theory would have predicted. For the fact is that the number of nuclear warheads has increased dramatically in both countries. And, moreover, the capabilities of strategic weapons deployed since then in the Soviet Union, and urged now for deployment in the United States, serve now to make the offensive forces of both nations more vulnerable to attack.

We must understand how and why this is happening. It is not my purpose to argue the deficiency of that American vision of the nuclear world which brought the SALT talks into being. It is only to remark that the facts of the real world come increasingly to diverge from what American strategic doctrine would have either desired or even predicted. It is in this sense that I speak of the "intellectual crisis" of arms control, for the ideas which underlay arms control seem no longer to influence either Soviet policy or even, in fact, our own.

The President's decision to advocate the deployment of the MX missiles signifies, if nothing else, a conclusion -- a decision -- that the United States must have a "counterforce" capability against Soviet land-based ICBMs. Not "would be nice to have..." but must have. As a government, we have never proposed any such thing. There may have been some within the government who thought it, or advocated it, but such has never been the declared policy of the government. Indeed, it was thought -- consistent with arms control doctrine -- that the possession of such a "counterforce" capability by both countries -- was a "worst case" situation.

The idea was a simple one: if each country knows that the other has the ability to destroy land-based missiles in a preemptive strike, each may come to perceive an advantage to itself in striking first. At best, new uncertainties will be introduced into the strategic balance. One would have thought that the most desirable situation would be one wherein neither country could perceive any advantage to itself in striking first. Now we have defined a new "worst case" -- namely that they will have this capability and we won't.

There will be opportunities aplenty to debate which is, in fact, the worse of these "worst cases." But the point I wish to stress is this: we now contemplate "counterforce"

in the name of arms control. Secretary Brown, for example, has told this Committee that the development of American "counterforce" capability will offer the Soviets a real incentive to reduce the numbers of vulnerable land-based missiles on their side. One cannot consider this proposition to be self-evident. Yet the proponents of it will ultimately come to maintain that the history of SALT, and especially, the history of American proposals for real reductions, reveals that nothing else has yet to give the Soviets such an incentive. They will say, for example, that our willingness to abandon the defense of our population did not make the Soviets more interested in such force reductions. They will say that the deployment of U. S. land-based missiles without formidable "counterforce" capability provided no such incentive either. How is one to quarrel with this history?

In any event, this is hardly the making of a new consensus on strategic policy. Can it be said that among the supporters of SALT II that there is acceptance of the argument that a new American counterforce capability is the only route to arms reductions in SALT III?

I suppose, therefore, that one question to pose is this: if the doctrine of "assured destruction" will show itself deficient in this respect, in what other respects will it come to show itself deficient? If there are other

deficiencies in our historic approach to these matters, ought we not find out about them as soon as possible? For the thrust of SALT is now plain: more weapons, more dangerous weapons, less stability.

I believe the SALT II treaty ought to become the occasion for testing the value of SALT itself -- not necessarily a new generation of missiles -- as a method of real arms limitation. The reductions in arms, envisioned as the promise of SALT III, should, in my view, be written into the SALT II treaty. It is as simple a matter of doing what we can to find out where we stand.

It is with this purpose in mind that, on August 1, I introduced an amendment to the SALT treaty. The amendment requires the conclusion of an agreement for "significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms" by the end of 1981, though that agreement can enter into force after the SALT II pact expires in 1985. If two years of arms reductions negotiations cannot, however, produce such an agreement, then the SALT II agreement itself would lapse at the end of 1981.

It may be said, I suppose, that this is a rather stark proposition, a rather tough bargain for SALT to strike with itself. And yet there is nothing visionary in it. One must be prepared for the prospect that no such agreement will prove possible, in which case we will finally understand that SALT -- as we have understood it -- is an impossibility of its own.

Here, I think, the Senate can play a useful role in clarifying what is a certain confusion in current American strategic policy, at least as I sense it. The Administration's defense of SALT II began with an invocation of the possibilities and promise of SALT III, an argument that the process itself was intrinsically valuable and therefore worthy of being kept alive. And yet, just this past Friday, the New York Times reports on the circulation of a new Presidential directive with a cautionary note about SALT III; future negotiations ought not to jeopardize existing U. S. military programs. One struggles for the meaning of this report in the light of the expectations previously raised about SALT III. But whatever it means, surely it reveals that the clarity we seek in matters of strategic policy is not yet present.

I submit that the energy necessary to recover the SALT process from itself cannot be generated inside that process, but must originate outside of it. It falls to the Senate to do this, to return SALT to its proper course.

FROM THE OFFICE OF

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

. New York

For Immediate Release
Wednesday, AM
October 31, 1979

Contact: Tim Russert
Vicki Bear
202/224-4451

Mr. President:

In this speech Moynihan criticizes your letter to Senator Byrd re the MX and cruise missile systems and the protocol.

SALT II

Don Tate

STATEMENT BY SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN (D., N.Y.)

on the

Floor of the U.S. Senate

Wednesday, October 31, 1979

On August 1, I introduced an amendment to the SALT treaty which would require the achievement of significant and substantial reduction in strategic arms in negotiations to be concluded by the end of 1981, or the SALT II treaty itself would lapse. The practical effect of this proposal would be to take the advisory language of a joint statement on SALT III -- currently a non-binding attachment to the treaty -- and make it part of the treaty text itself. The purpose here is, quite unambiguously to force the pace of arms reduction in the SALT III negotiations.

The time limit established in my amendment, December 31, 1981, is drawn from the Protocol to the treaty, an addition to the text, whose provisions expire on that date. The Protocol says, among other things, that neither side will deploy mobile launchers for ICBMs, and that neither will deploy ground-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. We have been assured by the Administration that there is no intention of extending the protocol, and that the American weapon systems affected by it would not be available for deployment until 1982 in any event.

This is a rather complex introduction to a simpler point, but one needs the specifics in order to follow recent developments bearing on the fate of the SALT treaty in the Senate. In the

first place, the Majority Leader has -- in that manner we have come to associate with him -- seen into the complex set of issues surrounding the SALT treaty, and has encouraged his colleagues to begin grappling with them. There are, as he has indicated in his approach to the treaty, two groups of issues which must be resolved if the treaty is to be ratified. The first affects our military programs, the second addresses the prospects for serious arms reductions in SALT III.

There is a sense in which the treaty itself joins these two questions together but not, I am beginning to believe, in the most useful and constructive way. Let me elaborate.

I have referred to a joint statement of principles presumed to govern the next round of the SALT negotiations. That statement says that the parties will seek "significant and substantial reductions" in strategic offensive arms. But the statement also pledges the parties to seek a "resolution of the issues included in the Protocol," that is, the issues of mobile ICBMs and ground-launched cruise missiles.

It is these two weapons systems which form the subject of a letter sent to the Senate Majority Leader by the President on October 26. The purpose of the letter is to remove doubts as to the strength of the President's commitment to these two systems. The President writes:

...I am prepared to assure you that none of our cruise missile programs (air, ground, or sea-launched) nor the MX program will be delayed or inhibited by the SALT II Protocol which will expire at the end of 1981.

It is my firm intention to proceed with the testing, development, and deployment of the recently approved sheltered ground mobile MX basing system, and with the currently programmed cruise missile deployments. Both are needed for our defense, and I cannot envisage any circumstances under which there would be any de facto extension of the Protocol which would interfere with our firm intention to deploy these systems.

On the face of it, that is surely a "resolution of the issues included in the Protocol," which the Soviets will no doubt seize upon to claim that the issue of reductions cannot be addressed either. They will attempt to give equal weight to the declaration on the Protocol, a weight comparable to that we say we will give to reductions.

Now this is surely a curious development. If, in the judgment of the Administration, the MX and cruise missiles programs are of such importance to the United States that nothing can interfere with their deployment, why in the world was their fate gratuitously attached to the problem of arms reductions? If, as the President suggests, the systems addressed in the Protocol will not be affected by subsequent negotiations, why have a protocol whose substance appears to offer the Soviets something of an out on the question of reductions? Or was any of this considered at the time the fate of reductions somehow became linked to the "issues included in the Protocol?"

It seems, on the face of it, that the relationship between the various parts of the Treaty on the one hand and the recent statement of the President on the other, seriously diminish the prospect for reductions in SALT III. Is this, in fact, what the President is trying to tell us?

There are, of course, powerful arguments to be advanced in support of the two military programs the President has endorsed, and in an era of rapid increases in Soviet military forces of all kinds, those arguments cannot be denigrated. Yet the manner in which these seem now to be developing suggests to me that the case for making the "reductions" aspect of SALT II obligatory has become more compelling. If the Administration understands that its intentions regarding the MX and the ground-launched cruise missiles have compromised the prospects for strategic arms reductions, it should tell us. If it feels otherwise, it should so explain. If it feels that diminishing the prospects for reductions is justified by the necessity of deploying these two systems, it should explain that also. There are, after all, arguments to be made in all these areas, yet clarification of the prospects for SALT III has now become, in my judgment, an urgent matter.

For myself, I have become much influenced by the fate of unilateral declarations by the Senate in these areas, and their ineffectuality as seen over time. In 1972, for example, three

declarations of Congressional policy -- advisory in nature -- were attached to the resolution which ratified the Interim Agreement. The first, proposed by Senator Jackson, urged the President to conclude a second SALT agreement which would not leave the forces of the United States inferior to those of the Soviet Union. Whether that criterion has been met is, of course, arguable. But with regard to the two other instances of Congressional "advice," there is no argument. For the second declaration, originating with Senator Cranston, urged the convening of "Strategic Arms Reduction Talks" to reduce arms. Yet seven years of SALT II negotiations have produced an agreement which allows for enormous increase in strategic weaponry. As for the third declaration, it concerned so-called "counterforce" weapons. It was originated by former Senator Edward Brooke and called upon both the Soviet Union and the United States not to develop a first-strike potential. At that time, which is to say seven years ago, technological innovations were contemplated which would have given to our land-based missiles an improved "hard target kill capability" -- which, in the general view, they did not then have to a meaningful degree. One could, of course, debate how much of this capability was already present in those forces at that time. But about the proposed MX system, there is no ambiguity. It is also unambiguous that, in the past seven years the Soviets have made

an unrelenting effort to acquire the kind of "counterforce" capability of which Senator Brooke spoke. Now, seven years later, the decision to proceed with the MX indicates that the United States feels it, too, must establish a similar capability.

Whether any of these worthy objectives written into the SALT I proceedings in 1972 might have influenced reality if given real legislative "teeth," I, of course, cannot say. But surely, that history as we now know it argues for not replaying such episodes in our consideration of SALT II.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1979


Dear Senator Byrd:

Thank you for your letter of October 19. I agree with you that "a strong defense and a willingness to negotiate meaningful arms reductions are complementary components of a sound national security policy."

During my Administration, I have energetically sought to enhance our overall defense capabilities and also to promote arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. I have done so because it is my firm view that our defense programs and arms control are the twin pillars of our national security. Accordingly, I am prepared to assure you that none of our cruise missile programs (air, ground, or sea-launched) nor the MX program will be delayed or inhibited by the SALT II Protocol which will expire at the end of 1981.

It is my firm intention to proceed with the testing, development, and deployment of the recently approved sheltered ground mobile MX basing system, and with the currently programmed cruise missile deployments. Both are needed for our defense, and I cannot envisage any circumstances under which there would be any de facto extension of the Protocol which could interfere with our firm intention to deploy these systems.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

FROM THE OFFICE OF

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

New York

Embargoed for Release
Wednesday, 2:00 p.m.
August 1, 1979

Contact: Tim Russert
Vicki Bear
202/224-4451

SALT II

STATEMENT BY SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN (D., N.Y.)

on the

Floor of the United States Senate

Wednesday, August 1, 1979

The SALT debate has become a debate on rearmament. If this is cause for dismay, it is no occasion for surprise.

For some while the pace of the Soviet arms buildup and the "asymmetry" of the SALT I agreement has been obvious to all save those whose concern it has been to avoid the obvious.

This avoidance was the subject of my first address to the Senate on March 4, 1977. At that time -- not so very far distant -- to draw attention to the rise of Soviet strategic power was to invite suspicion of grave unorthodoxy.

Thus in March 1977 the principal thrust of my remarks was to question the assumption, seemingly in place within the Administration, that Soviet behavior in nuclear weapons was basically imitative of United States behavior. This of course implied that if the United States restrained the growth of its forces, so also would the Soviets. I stated that there was no evidence for this.

I continued to press this point, and its corollary that the Soviets were approaching the moment when they will have neutralized our Minuteman force and attained to something like strategic superiority.

I put the case that the longer we took to recognize this reality the more likely it was to astound and confound us when finally we did.

It took a good two years, so far at least as the public pronouncements of the present Administration are concerned. Whether this was longer than need have been is beside the point. The time came.

Specifically, on February 21, 1979, in presenting the fiscal year 1980 defense budget to the Senate Budget Committee, Defense Secretary Harold Brown said that it "reflects the President's determination to begin countering the Soviet military buildup that has been underway for over fifteen years." The Secretary went on to document the trends in military spending during this period, here and in the Soviet Union. U.S. military investments, measured in terms of constant dollars, have been in a general decline since 1969.

The Soviets have had uninterrupted growth since about 1960. Since the early 1960s the Secretary said, "Soviet investment in new military hardware has increased twofold. . . and is more than twice ours today. . . . The upward trend shows every sign of continuing. . . . Soviet spending has shown no response to U.S. restraint -- when we build they build; when we cut they build."

In terms of military power, the Secretary used the phrase "rough equivalence, parity" to describe the balance today. During a brief colloquy, I asked "Would you say this, Mr. Secretary, that if the trend lines proceed, the Soviets would be ahead?" Secretary Brown replied, "They would be clearly ahead militarily."

The President finally spoke to the point in his address to the American Publishers Association in New York City on April 25, 1979. He stated: "Over the past decade, the Soviets have steadily increased their real defense spending, while ours has had a net decrease."

In the hearings now concluding on SALT II the thrust of this statement has been repeated over and over again by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. On Monday of this week, the present head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency predicted the Soviet Union would continue a "relentless" arms buildup, with or without the pact.

An administration that has seemed blind to reality, suddenly seems blinded by it.

On Wednesday of last week I met with a high official whom the Administration had had testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in favor of the SALT II. He had made his support conditional on a considerable increase in arms expenditure. I asked him to consider that the MX missile might never be built. In that event, he said, "We are lost."

Without wishing to belabor the point, I would repeat that the present alarms are in many ways the predictable consequence of the previous torpor. This is nothing new, and would be of no great matter were it not that in the course of our present debate on rearmament we risk abandoning all hope of a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty that might actually limit strategic arms.

More and more SALT II is referred to as peripheral or even irrelevant to our international position, either military or diplomatic.

More and more it is said of SALT II that its value, such as it may be, is that it preserves the SALT process.

I would contest this. The only value I can see in a SALT treaty is that it should limit strategic arms. The great irony is that the SALT process may in fact have become a barrier to just that. Far from solving the problem, the process has become the problem.

Certainly certain facts are clear.

In 1969 when discussion of an arms limitations treaty began, the Soviets had 1,050 ICBM warheads. In 1985 at the conclusion of SALT they will have upwards of 12,000. This is four warheads for every county in the United States. In terms of missile throwweight the Soviets will continue their rapid increase from their current level of 11.3 million pounds to 15.0 million pounds by 1985, the treaty's expiration date. This will be half again the American throwweight. The number of Soviet MIRVed missile launchers alone will almost double under the treaty period from the present level of about 700 to 1,200 in 1985.

The problem I suggest with the process is that -- so far -- it has required American negotiators to reach agreement with the Soviet Union in an area

where there is no agreement. Their strategic buildup has been underway, as Secretary Brown attests, for fifteen years. It was well underway when formal SALT negotiations began. It has never ceased because the Soviets would not agree to do so.

As a result, more often than not, the actual negotiations in SALT have taken place within the American government. The process goes something as follows. The advocates of strategic arms limitations obtain agreement to have "talks" -- that is the term -- with the Soviets. In these talks they find the Soviet government has already agreed with its military to continue their nuclear buildup. (At the time of SALT I the Soviets had already decided to build the SS 19, which they proceeded to do. This is one reason why our Minuteman force is now threatened.)

Accordingly a treaty is drafted which permits the increase in Soviet strategic forces the Soviets have already planned. Our negotiators return with this treaty which the American military in all honor cannot support unless a corresponding increase in American nuclear forces is also to take place. This is then agreed to on our side through a complex negotiation involving the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department and the Congress.

Thus, as The Washington Post observed only this morning, the commitment to the Trident submarine was made in order to gain approval of SALT I. Whatever its military utility, it was deemed to serve the purpose of the moment -- to win ratification of SALT I -- simply because it was -- big.

Similarly the M-X has become the price of SALT II. It is hard to describe this weapons system, for it changes every day. At minimum it is complex. More seriously, it will require the Soviets to deploy some 8000 warheads to neutralize it. (Two warheads per twenty possible sites for two hundred missiles.)

Thus the United States joins the arms race the Soviets insist on. This is the ultimate irony. Without thinking, without so far as I can tell even noticing, United States behavior in nuclear weapons has become basically imitative of Soviet behavior, because we have accepted the Soviet definition of "arms control."

By the end of SALT II the United States will have four nuclear warheads for every rayon -- the Soviet equivalent of our county -- in the Soviet Union.

In the meantime our conventional military forces grow relatively weaker with respect to the Soviets. In the kind of conflict one can imagine and could accept we are ever more likely to be overmastered. All because we wanted arms limitation and went about it badly.

The gods must weep.

I would hope we do not have to settle for this. I believe we can still negotiate a strategic arms limitation agreement that will limit arms.

Such hope as there exists for this is found in the "Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms," an appendage to the treaty, though not a part of it that sets the agenda for the next round of SALT. This Joint Statement calls for a third SALT agreement that will bring about a "significant and substantial reduction in the numbers of strategic arms," and "qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms...."

These are not instructions; even if they were they are not binding. They reflect nothing more than the ideals with which SALT I and SALT II were entered upon -- on our side. For it is an open secret that when the United States in Moscow, in March, 1977, proposed a specific reduction in strategic arms of one-third, the Soviets rejected any such specific. Less known, but now more important, at Vienna in June the United States proposed to the Soviets that the Joint Statement on SALT III call specifically for a one-third reduction in strategic arms and again the Soviets refused.

Worse. The United States entered into the negotiations for SALT I with a pronounced advantage in strategic weapons and those for SALT II with a sufficient advantage. The prospect is that the SALT III negotiations will begin with the Soviets anticipating strategic supremacy by the end of the process. In such circumstance, to hold out hopes for any real reduction is self-deception or worse.

Our only hope is to obtain agreement for a SALT III reduction of arms now while the United States still retains the option to head off that shift in the strategic balance. If there are to be reductions in SALT III, their attainment must be written into SALT II.

I therefore propose an amendment to the treaty which will add a new provision to Article XIX of the text:

4. The Parties shall conclude, by December 31, 1981, an agreement which shall, as a result of the negotiations undertaken in accordance with the Joint Statement of Principles and Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms agreed upon at Vienna on June 18, 1979, effect significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms, consistent with the requirement for the maintenance of essential strategic equivalence. This agreement shall enter into effect immediately upon the expiration of the present Treaty or sooner, as the Parties shall decide. If the Parties are unable to conclude such an agreement by December 31, 1981, the present Treaty shall terminate on that date.

Unlike other proposals which have been made to force the pace of the SALT III negotiations, this provision does not require undoing the present SALT II treaty. With respect to timing, it meshes with the expiration of the Protocol to the Treaty, which will itself automatically lapse on December 31, 1981.

This much is certain: our margin for error in SALT has disappeared. We must rescue the "process" from itself, otherwise it will present us with ever more unappealing choices. We must recover for SALT the possibility of arms limitation and genuine arms reductions. This, so it seems to me, is the major contribution the Senate can make to the preservation of the SALT process which the President, and others, seek. We must at least make the effort.

What I propose, in short, is to make it plain, so far as the future of the SALT process is concerned, that there will be no alternative to arms reductions. And I should think that two years is a sufficient time to achieve this goal, if there is a willingness to do it.

We have been at this process for ten years. We must now face the real issue and our real prospects. And we must now say to the Soviets -- and to ourselves -- that if there are not going to be any significant strategic arms reductions, we will not wait until the Soviets surpass us in strategic nuclear power, or are on the verge of so doing, before establishing this fact.

If the Soviets have no intention of reducing strategic arms until they have first attained to strategic superiority, now is the time to find out.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

08 Nov 79

FOR THE RECORD:

FRANK MOORE RECEIVED A COPY OF
THE ATTACHED.

6:30 PM

Frank
Good meeting
J

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1979

DINNER WITH SENATOR AND MRS. STEVENSON

Wednesday, November 7, 1979
6:30 p.m. (duration)
Residence

From: Frank Moore *F.M.*

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I. PURPOSE

To have an opportunity to visit with the Senator and Mrs. Stevenson and discuss issues in a casual atmosphere.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

A. Background:

Wife's name: Nancy

Children: Adlai, Lucy, Katie, Warwick

Home town: Hanover, Illinois

Committees: Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (4)
Commerce, Science and Transportation (6)
Select Intelligence (2)
Select Ethics (Chairman)

Personal: Senator Stevenson is generally negative about the direction of the country, the Senate and your Administration. His criticism of us, however, is reserved for his private conversations -- he has not openly criticized us on the Senate floor. The Senator's attitude has led him to decide not to run again for the Senate, but to leave himself open to a draft for the Presidential nomination. Obviously, he regards this as a long-shot and has done nothing to promote himself behind giving occasional intentions and general speeches. He thinks of himself as a gad-fly. Apparently there has been some speculation in Illinois that he might want to run for Governor.

Despite his attitude toward the Administration he has voted with us on virtually every major issue. He is supporting us on the Energy Security Corporation bill and will be for a strong windfall profits tax.

In the Senate, Stevenson has the reputation of being a guru rather than one who likes to work in the trenches. He rarely offers amendments, rarely participates in

floor management of bills, and makes few speeches on the Senate floor. He has almost no influence with his colleagues. He is too much of a philosopher to develop a following either in the Banking Committee where he could assume the leadership of a moderate block of Democrats or in the Senate as a whole. To some extent his position as Chairman of the Senate Ethics Committee has set him apart from his colleagues. It is the opinion of some people that it was this Chairmanship and Senator Talmadge's investigation which finally got him down and made him decide to leave the Senate.

Nancy Stevenson is known as one of the great political wives. She is warm and friendly and a great campaigner. She has been crucial in his campaigns. While living in Washington, she has become involved in community affairs, working to help black students get placed in independent schools.

The Stevensons have a farm in Illinois where they spend their summers. They like to travel and do so often.

SALT: Stevenson is clearly in the Hatfield-McGovern group of Senators who are dismayed about increased defense spending. He was critical of the MX decision. He had some concerns about verification, but his membership on the Intelligence Committee enabled him to get the answers he needed.

International Trade: He has been particularly interested in putting our trade with non-market economies on a less arbitrary basis. During consideration of the Export Administration Act he argued for simplified licensing procedures and less controls.

He has proposed amendments to the Trade Act and the Export-Import Bank which would considerably liberalize trade with the Soviet Union, including changing Jackson-Vanik so as to eliminate the need for the President to "receive assurances" on freedom of emigration.

He has supported MFN for the Soviets and would have preferred to have the Chinese and Soviet Agreements considered together.

Space Policy: As Chairman of the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, which handles the NASA budget authorization, and as a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, he has a broader insight into space than most on Capitol Hill.

He has pressed the Administration on several issues which could arise under either of his committee roles. Most probably are:

- (1) U.S. endorsement of Giscard d'Estaing's proposed UN International Verification Agency.

The U.S. has taken the position with the French, other Allies and the UN that an international satellite monitoring agency would be neither feasible nor desirable in the foreseeable future.

(2) Declassification of photoreconnaissance imagery for civil and private sector use.

There are several risks of national importance that have led your advisors to continue to counsel against declassification.

(3) Commitment to a more aggressive (read higher budget) civil space program, specifically including an operational LANDSAT program.

Increasing our civil space budget is not fiscally responsible. What is needed instead is innovation and initiative in use of the shuttle. As far as LANDSAT is concerned, you may wish to advise Stevenson you are currently assessing the recommendations of the NSC Policy Review Committee (Space) to establish an operational agency either under DoC or Interior.

EYES ONLY

November 5, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK MOORE

FROM: ANNE WEXLER *AW*

Harry McPherson was called by Adlai Stevenson and was asked to meet with him over the weekend to discuss his political situation vis-a-vis the President. Harry's report which must be extremely confidential is as follows:

1. In Harry's opinion Senator Stevenson would like to find a way to be for the President, although he knows that an endorsement would probably make him look foolish given his active criticism of the President's leadership.
2. Given his present lame duck status, he is more concerned about issues than he is about politics and feels that the President has a deeper commitment to issues than does Kennedy. With the proper kind of meeting with the President, Harry thinks that Adlai can be convinced to stay at least neutral. The issues which concern him are the problems of economic growth, productivity and increased job creation.
3. If for some reason Stevenson could be persuaded to come over and publicly endorse the President, he made it clear to the people he met with last weekend that he wanted to have the major role in the campaign in Illinois.
4. Others present at this meeting included some political people from Illinois and some down state county chairmen. They indicated that the support for Senator Kennedy down state was far greater than was publicly acknowledged and that the President was in bad shape in Illinois. They said that Senator Stevenson going with Kennedy at this point would be fatal to the President's chances in Illinois.

- 5. ~~He also reported that Paul Simon is endorsing Kennedy~~ this week which makes the Severson position all the more crucial.

} not true
per Frank
Moore (11/6/79)

In summary, he thought it was possible with the right approach to keep Adlai neutral - a position he would really like to have if given the opportunity.

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TO: HAM JORDAN

FROM: BOB BECKEL

RE: CONGRESSIONAL REACTION IRAN

DATE: NOVEMBER 8, 1979

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We have just returned from briefing over 200 members of the House on the Iranian situation. The following observations are important for your attention.

1. There is an extraordinary amount of hostility running through the Congress toward the Iranian students in the United States—from left to right, Democrat to Republican. There is a demand that we do something about the students, e.g. revoke all visas, freeze all assets, put them under arrest. This probably comes more from frustration over the lack of options available to us in dealing with the situation in Iran, but it is nonetheless real and potent. Specifically, we are encouraged almost unanimously to stop all demonstrations by Iranian students and to use our influence with local governments to refuse permits across the country.
2. Tom Harkin on the left and Bob Dornan on the right have joined forces to call for the ouster of the Shah. They are suggesting that we bent to political pressure from Kissinger and Rockefeller and as a result endangered American citizens in Iran. For the most part however, moderate voices in both the Republican and Democratic ranks support our policy of not relinquishing the Shah. We can expect, however, Dornan and Harkin to be more vocal than our supporters.
3. Although the issue was not raised during the briefing, we have heard a significant amount of comment on the President's trip to Canada. These comments, unanimously from our friends, urge the President not to go to Canada until the Iranian crisis is over. I am sure we would hear a good deal more if more members were focusing on the fact that he is taking the trip at all. Should he decide to go, I am convinced that there will be an uproar on the Hill.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/8/79

Bob Strauss

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson ..

cc: Sarah Weddington

DORIS TUCKER

Delores

*Strasser
will
call
J*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Delores

11/7/79

chip called w/message

"mom called from airplane and asked that chip ask you to have president call ~~Delores~~ tucker asking for support and congratulating on bill green's election.

doris tucker is national chairman of federation of democratic women and past secretary of state of pennsylvania.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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November 8, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: LLOYD N. CUTLER

SUBJECT: SALT

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee completed its mark-up hearings on the SALT Treaty this morning. The vote on reporting out the Treaty will be held at 10:00 tomorrow. Senator Javits has made a motion that the Treaty be favorably reported.

After Senator Glenn's statement yesterday, we now estimate that the vote in favor will be 9-6. This is based on conversations with Senator Zorinsky from which we can reasonably infer that he will vote in favor. The Vice President is having a breakfast with Zorinsky tomorrow.

It is conceivable but unlikely that Senator Stone will do the opposite of Glenn - i.e., voting in favor of reporting the Treaty, but indicating that he may vote against the Treaty if he does not obtain approval of his amendments on the Floor. If he does vote in favor the vote could be 10-5.

A copy of Senator Glenn's statement yesterday is attached. As you will see, he hopes to be able to vote in favor when the Treaty reaches the Floor. He has informed me that the monitoring improvements he is awaiting are things he believes can happen in December and January, not a year later.

cc: Hamilton Jordan
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Secretary Vance
Secretary Brown

Attachment

From the office of

from Mel Christopher
Senator John Glenn

204 Russell Office Building

Washington D.C. 20510 (202)224-3353



for immediate release

contact: Steve Avakian

CITING DOUBTS ON VERIFICATION,
GLENN ANNOUNCES HE WILL VOTE
AGAINST SALT II IN COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON---Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) declared today that he intends to press the case for tougher monitoring of Soviet compliance with the terms of SALT II and will vote against the treaty when it comes before the Foreign Relations Committee for final consideration later this week or next week.

"While I am for the SALT process, I am not in favor of sending the treaty to the full Senate at this time," Glenn told a news conference. "If we are forced to vote on the treaty in committee in the next few days, I must in good conscience vote against that action," Glenn said.

"I have said from the start of this debate that I will vote for the treaty only if we can adequately monitor and verify Soviet compliance with its terms at the time of the vote, not relying on future promises of a capability, we may or may not be able to develop."

The loss of U.S. listening posts in Iran earlier this year gravely damaged American ability to monitor certain critical aspects of Soviet strategic tests, Glenn said, and Carter Administration efforts to recoup that capability elsewhere have not been successful yet.

"The Administration is making a major effort to regain

SALT, first ad.

an adequate monitoring capability. I give them an 'A' for effort but so far they have come up short. I've said for many months that I won't vote for SALT II unless it's verifiable, and I intend to stick to that pledge. If and when I'm satisfied that we can reliably monitor Soviet tests, then I'll be an eager spokesman for SALT. But for now I must oppose sending the treaty to the floor.

"This issue has been a key concern of mine for over two years. I've read every report cover to cover, attended countless hearings and briefings, and even visited the negotiators in Geneva. - My concern on verification is not a newfound thing. Long before the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed the pact, I urged that our government go slow and make sure SALT II was verifiable when it was sent to the Senate. The Administration chose to do otherwise, and I regret that decision."

Glenn indicated he was now generally satisfied with other provisions of the treaty, particularly since 13 understandings he sponsored were adopted by the Foreign Relations Committee.

"I don't buy the theory that we must take risks in order to placate the Russians," Glenn said. "That approach rarely works when dealing with the Soviet Union. I believe it's possible to have a good treaty, a workable treaty, a treaty that can be verified. Waiting until solid monitoring

SALT, second ad.

capability is in place won't hurt the peace process and in fact will strengthen it. That capability, on a reliable basis, may be realized in the near future, although details remain highly classified."

"When that occurs, both sides would be in a position to enter SALT III negotiations in a spirit of confidence. The American people, for instance, would support SALT III talks because we would know that the terms of SALT II were being met."

Glenn noted that one of the greatest problems in dealing with public discussion of verification is the classified nature of specific sources and methods.

"Much of what I know on this issue is classified material, and frankly that makes it mighty tough to discuss. Some of the material is super-sensitive."

"Generating an intelligent debate on verification thus has been almost impossible. The issues go the very heart of our intelligence network around the world and must, of course, be secret. Yet, despite that major public relations problem, I think there is a growing awareness that SALT II is no panacea and that verification is a serious problem."

Glenn noted that many of his Understandings before the Foreign Relations Committee sought to close loopholes and ambiguities in the treaty.

SALT, third ad.

"I was determined that we not experience the mistakes of SALT I all over again. In that treaty we relied heavily on unilateral statements to resolve contentious issues only to discover that the Soviets had no intention of abiding by our interpretations."

Glenn added that "once the U.S. realized that the Soviets were going to exploit loopholes and ambiguities in the treaty, we failed to call them to account for their actions. My Understandings are designed to hold the Administration's feet to the fire, making it difficult for them this time not to enforce the treaty forcefully."

"Once we realized they were doing this, we should have been far tougher negotiators at SALT II," said Glenn. "I think the Foreign Relations Committee has made the treaty better, and I can vote for it if and when we get the technical capability to monitor Soviet compliance."

JHG/11/7/79

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/8/79

Jack Watson

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Electrostatic Copy Made November 7, 1979
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12:30 PM
ce
Jack - He will
be relying on you
& Strauss - Politically
favorable now
J

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JACK WATSON *Jack*
SUBJECT: Meeting with John Y. Brown, Governor-elect
of Kentucky, 12:30 p.m. Oval Office

This is an off the record meeting to let John Y. Brown know how we can help him assume the governorship in the coming months and throughout his term. Brown won with about 59% of the vote yesterday. His campaign focused on economic development, coal, and tobacco.

Dale Sights and Russ Morane suggest that you take a substantive approach with John, making it clear that, in the next few crucial months of his early Administration, you can help him a lot. He has stated that he is closer philosophically to you than to Kennedy, but that he does not "understand" you.

He has not comitted to either you or Senator Kennedy. The Senator was invited to do a fundraiser for him in October. Brown later reported to Sights that the event and the Senator's performance were not as successful as had been expected.

On the substantive side, you should ask him how you can help him with his priorities--coal, marketing agricultural products, and economic development. You can offer to have various members of the staff and Cabinet brief him. You can tell him about your own experience with economic development in Georgia, as well as with Zero Based Budgeting, in which he seems to have an interest.

On the political side, you should ask for his endorsement. You understand that he is just getting into the job, and you believe that your Administration can work well with his, and hope that will be the case in the coming months and years. You hope that he will work with Dale Sights to get our organization structured in Kentucky. You would like to have Phyllis campaign for you, and would like to ask her to do so. You have heard from Dale Sights that John's father has offered to help you in his role on the State Council on Aging; you appreciate the offer and accept it.

Economic Adviser Breakfast 11/8/79

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Econ. Mtg 11-8-79

Anti-inflation

WPI \rightarrow non-energy use

Chrysler. Used contribution

Pres role pubhize Anti Inff.

Kahn, others hope NCC

Δ CPI as inff index

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Economic Advisor Breakfast 11/8/79

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Econ. Mtg 11-8-79

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