

**1/7/80 [2]**

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1/7/80

Rick Hutcheson --

Sequence of drafts from  
first "Presidential notes and  
draft" to original speech text--  
re address to nation on  
US-USSR relationship/Afghanistan.

(Does not include teleprompter  
script)

-- Susan Clough

Original Speech Text

1. I COME TO YOU THIS EVENING  
TO DISCUSS THE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT  
AND RAPIDLY CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.
2. I CONTINUE TO SHARE WITH YOU THE SENSE OF OUTRAGE AND IMPATIENCE
3. BECAUSE OF THE KIDNAPPING OF INNOCENT AMERICAN HOSTAGES
4. AND THE HOLDING OF THEM BY MILITANT TERRORISTS  
WITH THE SUPPORT & APPROVAL OF IRANIAN OFFICIALS.
5. OUR PURPOSES CONTINUE TO BE
6. THE PROTECTION OF THE LONG-RANGE INTERESTS OF OUR NATION
7. AND THE SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.
8. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICANS
9. THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS,
10. AND THROUGH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.
11. WE ARE DETERMINED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL.
12. WE HOPE TO DO SO WITHOUT BLOODSHED
13. AND WITHOUT FURTHER DANGER TO THE LIVES OF OUR 50 FELLOW AMERICANS.
14. IN THESE EFFORTS WE CONTINUE TO HAVE THE STRONG SUPPORT OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

1. THE UNITY AND COMMON SENSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE  
UNDER SUCH TRYING CIRCUMSTANCES
2. ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS.

\* \* \*

3. RECENTLY THERE HAS BEEN ANOTHER VERY SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT
4. WHICH THREATENS THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.
5. MASSIVE SOVIET MILITARY FORCES  
HAVE INVADED THE SMALL NON-ALIGNED, SOVEREIGN NATION OF AFGHANISTAN,
6. WHICH HAD HITHERTO NOT BEEN AN OCCUPIED SATELLITE OF THE SOVIET UNION.
7. 50,000 HEAVILY ARMED SOVIET TROOPS HAVE CROSSED THE BORDER,
8. AND ARE NOW DISPERSED THROUGHOUT AFGHANISTAN,
9. ATTEMPTING TO CONQUER THE FIERCELY INDEPENDENT MUSLIM PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY.
10. THE SOVIETS CLAIM FALSELY THAT THEY WERE INVITED INTO AFGHANISTAN
11. TO HELP PROTECT THAT COUNTRY FROM SOME UNNAMED OUTSIDE THREAT.
12. BUT PRESIDENT AMIN,  
WHO HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF AFGHANISTAN BEFORE THE SOVIET INVASION,
13. WAS ASSASSINATED -- ALONG WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY --
14. AFTER THE SOVIETS GAINED CONTROL OF THE CAPITAL CITY OF KABUL.
15. ONLY SEVERAL DAYS LATER WAS THE NEW PUPPET LEADER  
EVEN BROUGHT INTO AFGHANISTAN BY THE SOVIETS.

1. THIS INVASION IS AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE --
2. BECAUSE OF THE THREAT OF FURTHER SOVIET EXPANSION  
INTO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA,
3. AND ALSO BECAUSE SUCH AN AGGRESSIVE MILITARY POLICY  
IS UNSETTLING TO OTHER PEOPLES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.
4. IT IS A CALLOUS VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.
5. IT IS A DELIBERATE EFFORT OF A POWERFUL ATHEISTIC GOVERNMENT  
TO SUBJUGATE AN INDEPENDENT ISLAMIC PEOPLE.
6. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN TO STABILITY & PEACE.
7. A SOVIET OCCUPIED AFGHANISTAN THREATENS BOTH IRAN AND PAKISTAN
8. AND IS A STEPPING STONE TO ~~THEIR~~ POSSIBLE CONTROL  
OVER MUCH OF THE WORLD'S OIL SUPPLIES.
9. THE UNITED STATES WANTS ALL NATIONS IN THE REGION  
TO BE FREE AND TO BE INDEPENDENT.

1. IF THE SOVIETS ARE ENCOURAGED IN THIS INVASION BY EVENTUAL SUCCESS,
2. AND IF THEY MAINTAIN THEIR DOMINANCE OVER AFGHANISTAN
3. AND THEN EXTEND THEIR CONTROL TO ADJACENT COUNTRIES --
4. THE STABLE, STRATEGIC, AND PEACEFUL BALANCE OF THE WORLD WILL BE CHANGED.
5. THIS WOULD THREATEN THE SECURITY OF ALL NATIONS  
INCLUDING, OF COURSE, THE UNITED STATES, OUR ALLIES & FRIENDS.
6. THEREFORE, THE WORLD CANNOT STAND BY  
AND PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO COMMIT THIS ACT WITH IMPUNITY.
7. ~~MORE THAN 40~~ <sup>FIFTY</sup> NATIONS HAVE PETITIONED THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
8. TO CONDEMN THE SOVIET UNION
9. AND TO DEMAND THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN.
10. WE REALIZE THAT UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
11. THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS  
MAY VETO ACTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
12. IF THE WILL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE THWARTED IN THIS MANNER,
13. THEN AN IMMEDIATE ACTION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE  
IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
WHERE NO SOVIET VETO EXISTS.

1. IN THE MEANTIME, NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR ANY OTHER NATION
2. WHICH IS COMMITTED TO WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY
3. CAN CONTINUE TO DO BUSINESS AS USUAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
4. I HAVE ALREADY RECALLED THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR FROM MOSCOW TO WASHINGTON.
5. HE IS WORKING WITH ME AND MY OTHER SENIOR ADVISERS
6. IN AN IMMEDIATE AND COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION
7. OF THE WHOLE RANGE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

\* \* \*

8. THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF THE "SALT II" TREATY
9. HAS BEEN A MAJOR GOAL AND A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS ADMINISTRATION --
10. AND WE AMERICANS, THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND INDEED THE ENTIRE WORLD
11. WILL BENEFIT FROM THE SUCCESSFUL CONTROL OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS
12. THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED TREATY.

1. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET AGGRESSION
2. I HAVE ASKED THE UNITED STATES SENATE
3. TO DEFER FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE "SALT II" TREATY
4. SO THAT THE CONGRESS AND I CAN ASSESS SOVIET ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS
5. AND DEVOTE OUR PRIMARY ATTENTION TO THE LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER MEASURES REQUIRED  
TO RESPOND TO THIS CRISIS.
6. AS CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE IN THE FUTURE
7. WE WILL, OF COURSE, KEEP THE RATIFICATION OF "SALT II" UNDER ACTIVE REVIEW
8. IN CONSULTATION WITH THE LEADERS OF THE SENATE.
9. WE WILL DELAY OPENING OF ANY NEW AMERICAN OR SOVIET <sup>AMBASSIES</sup> CONSULAR FACILITIES,  
*THE SOVIETS MUST UNDERSTAND OUR DEEP CONCERN-*
10. AND MOST OF THE CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC EXCHANGES CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION  
WILL BE DEFERRED.
11. I HAVE DECIDED TO HALT OR REDUCE EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION
12. IN THREE AREAS THAT ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO THEM.
13. THESE NEW POLICIES WILL BE COORDINATED WITH THOSE OF OUR ALLIES.

1. --I HAVE DIRECTED THAT NO ~~SALES OF~~ HIGH TECHNOLOGY OR OTHER STRATEGIC ITEMS
2. WILL BE LICENSED FOR SALE TO THE SOVIET UNION UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE,  
WHILE WE REVISE OUR LICENSING POLICY.
3. --FISHING PRIVILEGES FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN UNITED STATES WATERS  
WILL BE SEVERELY CURTAILED.
4. --THE 17 MILLION TONS OF GRAIN ORDERED BY THE SOVIET UNION  
IN EXCESS OF THAT AMOUNT WHICH WE ARE COMMITTED TO SELL  
UNDER A FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT  
WILL NOT BE DELIVERED.
5. THIS GRAIN WAS NOT INTENDED FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION
6. BUT WAS TO BE USED FOR BUILDING UP SOVIET LIVESTOCK HERDS.
7. I AM DETERMINED TO MINIMIZE  
ANY ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN FARMER FROM THIS ACTION.
8. THE UNDELIVERED GRAIN WILL BE REMOVED FROM THE MARKET
9. THROUGH STORAGE AND PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS
10. AND THROUGH PURCHASES AT MARKET PRICES.
11. WE WILL ALSO USE INCREASED AMOUNTS OF GRAIN
12. TO ALLEVIATE HUNGER IN POOR COUNTRIES
13. AND FOR GASOHOL PRODUCTION HERE AT HOME.

1. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OTHER PRINCIPAL GRAIN EXPORTING NATIONS,
2. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL NOT REPLACE THESE QUANTITIES OF GRAIN
3. BY ADDITIONAL SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION.
  
4. THESE ACTIONS WILL REQUIRE SOME SACRIFICE ON THE PART OF ALL AMERICANS,
5. BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THESE ACTIONS
6. ARE IN THE INTEREST OF WORLD PEACE AND THE SECURITY OF OUR OWN NATION,
7. AND ARE ALSO COMPATIBLE WITH ACTIONS BEING TAKEN
8. BY OUR OWN MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS AND OTHERS ~~NATIONS~~
9. WHO SHARE OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THIS NEW SOVIET THREAT TO WORLD STABILITY.
  
10. ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES WOULD PREFER NOT TO WITHDRAW
11. FROM THE OLYMPIC GAMES SCHEDULED IN MOSCOW THIS SUMMER,
12. THE SOVIET UNION MUST REALIZE THAT ITS CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS
13. WILL ENDANGER BOTH THE PARTICIPATION OF ATHLETES
14. AND THE TRAVEL TO MOSCOW BY SPECTATORS WHO WOULD NORMALLY WISH  
TO ATTEND THE OLYMPIC GAMES.

1. ALONG WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
2. WE WILL PROVIDE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, FOOD, AND OTHER ASSISTANCE --
3. TO HELP PAKISTAN DEFEND ITS INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
4. AGAINST THE SERIOUSLY INCREASED THREAT IT NOW FACES FROM THE NORTH.
5. THE UNITED STATES ALSO STANDS READY TO HELP OTHER NATIONS IN THE REGION  
IN SIMILAR WAYS.
6. NEITHER OUR ALLIES NOR OUR POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES
7. SHOULD HAVE THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT
8. ABOUT OUR WILLINGNESS, OUR DETERMINATION, AND OUR CAPACITY
9. TO TAKE THE MEASURES I HAVE OUTLINED.
10. I HAVE CONSULTED WITH THE LEADERS OF CONGRESS
11. AND AM CONFIDENT THEY WILL SUPPORT LEGISLATION THAT MAY BE REQUIRED  
TO CARRY OUT THESE MEASURES.



PO 1000 112  
President Jimmy Carter

VERY ROUGH DRAFT

January 4, 1980 (A 17)

I come to you this evening with an extremely important and sober explanation of the rapidly changing circumstances in *Southwest Asia* [~~the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asian region of the world.~~]

I continue to share with you the sense of outrage and impatience because of the kidnapping of innocent American hostages and the holding of them by militant terrorists [~~in Iran~~] with the support and approval of Iranian officials.

Our purposes continue to be the protection of <sup>the</sup> long-range interests of our nation and the safety of the American hostages.

Through the International Court of Justice, through the United Nations, and through public and private diplomatic efforts, we are attempting to secure the release of the hostages [~~and their~~

*We are determined*  
return home] and to accomplish this goal without bloodshed

which would further endanger the lives of our 50 fellow Americans.

President's Draft #1

<sup>These</sup>  
In ~~[our]~~ efforts ~~[to maintain peace, to condemn this~~  
~~illegal action by Iran, and to secure the release of our hostages]~~  
we continue to have the strong support of the world community.

The unity of the American people and your patience  
under such trying circumstances <sup>are</sup> ~~[is]~~ an integral part of the  
success of our effort.

Recently there has been another very serious development  
which threatens the maintenance of peace in Southwest Asia.

In a drastic departure from recent policy of the Soviet Union,  
<sup>massive</sup>  
^ Soviet military forces have invaded the small non-aligned,  
sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which had hitherto not been  
an occupied satellite of the Soviets. ~~[Massive]~~ ~~[Soviet military~~  
forces<sup>↑</sup> have crossed the border, now comprising 50,000 heavily armed  
<sup>Soviet</sup>  
^ troops.

<sup>and</sup>  
~~[These Soviet forces]~~ are now dispersed throughout  
Afghanistan, <sup>(conquer)</sup> ~~[now]~~ attempting to subjugate the fiercely independent  
Muslim people of that country.

In our efforts to maintain peace, to condemn this illegal action by Iran, and to secure the release of our hostages we continue to have the strong support of the world community.

The unity of the American people and your patience under such trying circumstances is an integral part of the success of our effort.

*Conquer  
Subdue  
vanquish*

Recently there has been another very serious development which threatens the maintenance of peace in Southwest Asia. In a drastic departure from recent policy of the Soviet Union, Soviet military forces have invaded the small non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which had hitherto not been an occupied satellite of the Soviets. Massive Soviet military forces have crossed the border, now comprising 50,000 heavily armed troops.

These Soviet forces are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan, now attempting to *Conquer* subjugate the fiercely independent Muslim people of that country.

The Soviets claim falsely that they were invited into Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed outside force. But President Amin, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated, along with several members of his family -- while the Soviets controlled the capitol.

Only later was a Soviet puppet leader even brought into Afghanistan by the Soviets.

This Soviet invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace -- both involving danger of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries, danger to Southwest Asia, and also unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.

It is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.

It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government <sup>to subjugate</sup> an independent Islamic people.

We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan. The United States wants all nations in the region to be free, and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged in this invasion by eventual success and maintain their subjugation of Afghanistan, and then extend this kind of action to other parts of the region -- the stable, strategic and peaceful balance of the world will be changed. This would threaten the security of all nations, including, of course, the United States, our allies and friends.

*dominance over*

Therefore, the world cannot stand by and permit the Soviets to commit this act with impunity.

We and more than 40 other nations -- large and small, Eastern and Western, Christian and Muslim -- have petitioned the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union and to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

The Soviets claim falsely that they were invited into Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed outside <sup>threat</sup> [force]. But President Amin, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated, along with several members of his family -- while the Soviets controlled the capital <sup>a</sup> city of Kabul.

Only later was <sup>the</sup> [a] ~~Soviet~~ puppet leader even brought into Afghanistan by the Soviets.

This [Soviet] invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace -- <sup>because of the threat</sup> [both] involving <sup>in</sup> [danger] of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries, <sup>in</sup> danger to Southwest Asia, and also <sup>because such an aggressive military policy is</sup> unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.

It is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.

It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people.

We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan, *and of stability and peace in this region of the world.*  
The United States wants all nations in the region to be free

and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged in this  
invasion by eventual success, and <sup>if they</sup> maintain their subjugation of  
Afghanistan, and then extend this kind of action to other parts  
of the region -- the stable, strategic and peaceful balance  
of the world will be changed. This would threaten the security  
of all nations, including, of course, the United States, our allies  
and friends.

Therefore, the world cannot stand by and permit the  
Soviets to commit this act with impunity.

We and more than 40 other nations [~~large and small,~~  
~~Eastern and Western, Christian and Muslim~~] have petitioned  
the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union  
and to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops  
from Afghanistan.

We realize that under the United Nations Charter  
along with <sup>and</sup> other permanent members, the Soviets have the right  
to veto action of the Security Council. If the will of the  
Security Council should be subverted in this manner, then an  
immediate action <sup>in</sup> by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
where no Soviet veto exists, would be appropriate.

In the meantime, we and other like-minded nations  
who are committed to world peace and stability cannot continue  
business as usual with the Soviet Union.

I have already recalled the United States Ambassador  
~~[to the Soviet Union]~~ from Moscow to Washington. He <sup>is working with</sup> joins me and  
<sup>other</sup> my senior advisers in an immediate and comprehensive evaluation  
<sup>of the whole range of</sup> our relations with the Soviet Union. ~~[We will consider~~  
~~specifically and rigorously the whole range of U.S.-Soviet~~  
~~relations.]~~

The successful negotiation of the SALT II Treaty has been a major goal and a major achievement of this Administration -- ~~whether or not our relations improve in the future.~~

and we, the Soviets, and indeed the entire world will benefit from the successful control of Strategic Nuclear Weapons through the implementation of this carefully negotiated Treaty.

However, because of the Soviet <sup>aggression</sup> progression and the impossibility of ratification of the Treaty at this time, I have asked the ~~(Majority Leader of the)~~ United States Senate to defer for the time being <sup>any further</sup> ~~[the Senate's]~~ consideration of the SALT II Treaty.

As circumstances change in the future, we will, of course, keep the ~~[matter of of]~~ ratification of SALT II under active review and consultation with the leaders of the Senate.

We will delay <sup>any</sup> opening of new Embassy and Consular facilities, and will insist on strict reciprocity in the number of diplomats assigned to each country, travel restraints on visiting officials, and media representation.

Commercial trade with the Soviet Union will be severely restricted, <sup>a</sup> And I have directed that no sales of high technology items to the Soviet Union will be licensed. *These new policies will be coordinated with those of our allies.*

Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in United States waters will be severely curtailed.

All but the most essential cultural and economic exchanges currently under consideration with the Soviet Union will be either deferred or suspended.

*Grain*  
Agricultural products ordered by the Soviet Union <sup>in excess</sup> (since *of that amount to which we are committed to sell under a five-year agreement* October) will not be delivered. This involves a substantial <sup>in none of which</sup> quantity of grain which was (not) destined for human consumption but was to be used for feeding livestock.

price support and reserve storage policies of the Department of Agriculture.

We

I will take action through Agricultural policy,

*to remove the grain from the market, the full grain, which will be shipped to the Soviet Union.*  
The use of <sup>additional</sup> budget funding, and ~~shifting~~ of grains for gasohol <sup>fuel</sup> production

and to alleviate hunger in poor countries will ~~to~~ minimize the <sup>any</sup> adverse effect on the American farm community.

*After consultation with other principal grain exporting nations, I am confident that they will not replace these quantities of grain by additional shipments to the Soviet Union.*

These actions will require some sacrifice on the part

of all Americans -- those involved in <sup>agriculture,</sup> trade and commerce, and those who are taxpayers required to finance <sup>the additional</sup> budget expenditures.

But there is no doubt that these actions are in the interest of world peace and the security of our own nation, and are also compatible with actions being taken by our own major trading partners and other nations who share our deep concern about

*this these new*  
the Soviet threat to peace *World stability.*

At this time we do not contemplate withdrawing from the World Olympics scheduled in Moscow this summer, *but*

*←* ~~But~~ the Soviets must realize that their continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of athletes [~~in the Olympics~~] and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.

We will work with other nations to provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to Pakistan -- to help that nation, which borders on Afghanistan, ~~to~~ deal effectively with the seriously increased threat it faces from the North.

← The United States stands ready also to help other nations in the region in similar ways.

→ About our willingness, our determination, and our capacity to take the measures I have outlined neither our allies nor our potential adversaries should have the slightest doubt.

History teaches perhaps few clear lessons. But surely one such lesson learned by the world at great cost is that aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease.

The response of the international community to the Soviets' <sup>only</sup> attempt to subjugate Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviets' action. The United States [for its part] will meet its responsibilities.

We will work with other nations to provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to Pakistan -- to help that nation, which borders on Afghanistan, to deal effectively with the seriously increased threat it faces from the North.

The United States stands ready also to help other nations in the region in similar ways.

About our willingness, our determination, and our capacity to take the measures I have outlined neither our allies nor our potential adversaries should have the slightest doubt.

History teaches perhaps few clear lessons. But surely one such lesson learned by the world at great cost is that aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease.

The response of the international community to the Soviets attempt to <sup>crush</sup> subjugate Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviets action. The United States for its part will meet its responsibilities.

[ Our commitment is to meet these responsibilities peacefully, in cooperation with other peace-loving nations and in accordance with international law. ]

*and working with other nations,*

With the support of the American people, we will deter aggression, protect our nation's security, and preserve the peace.

# # #

President's 2nd Draft

President Jimmy Carter  
Draft -- January 4, 1980

I come to you this evening with an extremely important and sober explanation of the rapidly changing circumstances in Southwest Asia.

I continue to share with you the sense of outrage and impatience because of the kidnapping of innocent American hostages and the holding of them by militant terrorists with the support and approval of Iranian officials.

Our purposes continue to be the protection of the long-range interests of our nation and the safety of the American hostages.

We are attempting to secure the release of the hostages through the International Court of Justice, through the United Nations, and through public and private diplomatic efforts.

We are determined to accomplish this goal, *we hope to do so* without bloodshed *and without* ~~which would~~ further ~~endanger~~ *to* the lives of our 50 fellow Americans.

In these efforts we continue to have the strong support of the world community.

The unity of the American people and your patience under such trying circumstances are an integral part of the success of our effort.

\* \* \*

Recently there has been another very serious development which threatens the maintenance of peace in Southwest Asia.

In a drastic departure from recent policy of the Soviet Union, massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which had hitherto not been an occupied satellite of the Soviets.

Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops have crossed the border, and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan, attempting to conquer the fiercely independent Muslim people of that country.

The Soviets claim falsely that they were invited into Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed outside threat. But President Amin, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated -- along with several members of his family -- <sup>after the</sup> while the Soviets <sup>gained</sup> control <sup>led</sup> the capital city of Kabul.

Only <sup>several days</sup> later was the <sup>new</sup> puppet leader even brought into Afghanistan by the Soviets.

This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace -- because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia, and also because such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.

It is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.

It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people.

We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan <sup>to</sup> ~~and of~~ stability and peace in this region of the world.

*Map* → The United States wants all nations in the region to be free and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged in this invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain their dominance over Afghanistan and then extend <sup>their control</sup> ~~this kind~~ <sup>over adjacent countries</sup> ~~of action to~~ ~~other parts of the region~~ -- the stable, strategic and peaceful balance of the world will be changed. This would threaten the security of all nations including, of course, the United States, our allies and friends.

Therefore, the world cannot stand by and permit the Soviets to commit this act with impunity.

We and more than 40 other nations have petitioned the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union and to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

We realize that under the United Nations Charter the Soviets and other permanent members <sup>may</sup> [~~have the right to~~] veto action of the Security Council.

If the will of the Security Council should be <sup>thwarted</sup> subverted in this manner, then an immediate action would be appropriate in the General Assembly of the United Nations where no Soviet veto exists.

In the meantime, <sup>neither we or other</sup> we [~~and other like-minded~~] nations who are committed to world peace and stability can~~not~~ continue business as usual with the Soviet Union.

I have already recalled the United States Ambassador from Moscow to Washington. He is working with me and my other senior advisers in an immediate and comprehensive evaluation of the whole range of our relations with the Soviet Union.

The successful negotiation of the SALT II Treaty has been a major goal and a major achievement of this Administration -- and we, the Soviets, and indeed the entire world will benefit from the successful control of Strategic Nuclear Weapons through the implementation of this carefully negotiated Treaty.

However, because of the Soviet aggression [and the impossibility of ratification of the Treaty at this time,] I have asked the United States Senate to defer for the time being any further consideration of the SALT II Treaty.

As circumstances change in the future we will, of course, keep the ratification of SALT II under active review [and] in consultation with the leaders of the Senate.

We will delay any opening of new Embassy and Consular facilities, and will insist on strict reciprocity in <sup>any limitation on</sup> the number of diplomats assigned to each country, travel restraints on visiting officials, and media representation.

Commercial trade with the Soviet Union will be severely restricted, and I have directed that no sales of high technology items to the Soviet Union will be licensed. These new policies will be coordinated with those of our allies.

Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in United States waters will be severely curtailed.

All but the most essential cultural and economic exchanges currently under consideration with the Soviet Union will be either deferred or suspended.

*Approximately 17 million tons of*  
Grain ordered by the Soviet Union in excess of that amount which we are committed to sell under a five-year agreement will not be delivered. This involves a substantial quantity

of grain -- none of which was destined for human consumption  
but was to be used for <sup>building up Soviet</sup> ~~feeding~~ livestock, <sup>herds.</sup>

We will take action through price support and  
reserve storage policies of the Department of Agriculture  
to remove this grain from the market.

The use of grain for gasohol fuel production and to  
alleviate hunger in poor countries will minimize any adverse  
effect on the American farm community.

After consultation with other principal grain exporting  
nations, I am confident that they will not replace these quantities  
of grain by additional shipments to the Soviet Union.

These actions will require some sacrifice on the part  
of all Americans -- those involved in agriculture, trade and  
commerce, and those who are taxpayers required to finance the  
additional budget expenditures.

But there is no doubt that these actions are in the interest of world peace and the security of our own nation, and are also compatible with actions being taken by our own major trading partners and other nations who share our deep concern about this new Soviet threat to world stability.

*While the U.S. prefers not to*  
[At this time we do not contemplate] withdraw[ing] from the World Olympics scheduled in Moscow this summer, but the Soviets must realize that their continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.

We will work with other <sup>*countries*</sup> [nations] to provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to Pakistan -- to help that nation, which borders on Afghanistan, deal effectively

with the seriously increased threat it faces from the North.

The United States also stands ready to help other nations in the region in similar ways.

Neither our allies nor our potential adversaries should have the slightest doubt about our willingness, our determination, and our capacity to take the measures I have outlined.

History teaches perhaps few clear lessons. But surely one such lesson learned by the world at great cost is that aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease.

The response <sup>by</sup> ~~to~~ the international community to the Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviet action. The United States will meet its responsibilities.

With the support of the American people and working with other nations, we will deter aggression, protect our nation's security, and preserve the peace.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZS*  
SUBJECT: Speech Additions

Here are some minor additions to the original speech draft from which you worked. You might consider adding them or rewording the appropriate passages.

At the early afternoon meeting I will bring with me the more important wording recommendations on commercial and agricultural relations, and I will have with me comments by Stu, Lloyd and others on the original draft (though many of them may now be OBE). If you want those comments earlier, I will rush them to you.

PARAGRAPH ON ALLIED RESPONSE

We are in close touch with our allies, to make sure that our actions are supported and that no advantage is taken of the sacrifices we are making for the sake of peace and our common interests. I have been encouraged by their initial responses. We will continue to stress that international solidarity is essential in meeting this Soviet threat to international peace and stability.

ADDITIONAL OR AMENDED PARAGRAPHS

1. P.1, second paragraph:

"By moving fifty thousand Soviet troops into Afghanistan; by its complicity in the murder of that country's President; by fighting and attempting to overwhelm Afghanistan's armed forces; by forcibly installing a puppet regime in the capital; by continuing its military actions to this day; and by attempting to obscure the facts about its aggression, the Soviet Union has laid bare its intention to destroy the independence of Afghanistan: to hammer a small but sovereign country into the new shape of a captive state." (Changes underlined)

2. Fisheries:

"I have also directed the Department of State to withhold any further allocations to the Soviet Union for fishing rights within the U.S. 200-mile fishery zone. This action will result in the immediate loss to the Soviet fish industry of approximately 360,000 tons, an amount equivalent to approximately 5% of their total fish catch around the world."

3. Vice references to levels of Soviet diplomatic personnel and Soviet press, substitute:

"I have directed that the necessary steps be taken to insure that strict reciprocity is enforced with regard to the numbers of Soviet diplomatic representatives and media personnel in the United States. And we will also act on the basis of strict reciprocity in restrictions on official Soviet travel in this country."

4. New paragraph on aid to Pakistan:

"I am asking the Congress to remove restrictions on American assistance to Pakistan. The United States Government must be able to provide the military equipment, food and other assistance to Pakistan that is necessary to help that nation, which borders on Afghanistan, deal effectively with the seriously increased threat that it faces from the north. I believe that we can develop, together with the Congress, a means of balancing our continuing concerns about Pakistan's nuclear activities with the urgent need to respond, in a clear and credible manner, to the Soviet challenge to peace in Asia."

5. Suggested addition at conclusion:

"The United States, for its part, will meet its responsibilities. This will require certain sacrifices on our part. I am determined that the burdens of this sacrifice be carried, as fairly as possible, by our society as a whole. I am certain that our nation, as a whole, will bear this burden courageously and in unity. I am confident our allies will join us in our efforts.

"We have sacrificed, before, to oppose aggression. Our position in the world, and our pride, cannot be sold at any price. We will never place our profits ahead of our freedom. This is what has always made our nation strong. It makes us strong today."

Consultations/Notification Plan  
for Presidential Speech

Overall Timetable

January 4, 1980

2:30 pm Market closes

2:45 pm Arrangements meeting to complete and implement consultations/notification plans

3:30 pm CL Consultations with Congressional Leadership begins

5:00 pm Cabinet and Senior Staff meeting

6:00 pm Notification calls begin to agreed lists

9:00 pm Speech

January 5, 1980

am Supplemental press briefings at Commerce, Agriculture and State

2:00 pm Q&As due to McDonald from  
State  
Commerce  
STR  
Agriculture  
Labor  
(available to State by late afternoon for transmission to U.S. Embassies abroad)

January 7, 1980

pm Constituency meetings at Commerce and Agriculture

## Notification Groups/Responsibilities

1. Cabinet and Senior Staff: Watson arranging; meeting at 5:00 pm
2. Congressional Leaders : WH CL coordinating; consultation calls begin following mid-afternoon clearance
3. Farm Groups: Department of Agriculture

Notification calls begin after receipt of talking points at 6:00 pm

Suggested Activities: "Hot Line" for special inquiries on details from 8:30 am Saturday

Saturday am briefing for agricultural press

Monday pm constituency meeting to explain details

4. Business Groups:

White House: Calls to Chairman of President's Export Council (Jones); US/USSR Trade Council (Verity)

State: Calls to selected business leaders (e.g., Shapiro, Murphy, Carey, Hammer, Eaton)

Treasury: Calls to key bank officials (e.g., Clawson, Rockefeller, Wriston, Weatherstrom)

Follow up activities: "Hot Line" for inquiries after speech from 8:30 am Saturday

Saturday briefing for business/financial press

Monday pm meeting with constituency groups

5. State and Local Officials:

Combined notification team coordinated by Watson

Planned Activities: Askew to call Busbee and governors involved in the Export Committee

Bergland to call key grain state governors

Watson to handle calls to others as needed

6. Labor Leadership: Landon Butler coordinating calls (with Secretary Marshall)

7. Political Leadership: Jordan to cover by telephone

8. Foreign Policy Groups: State handling calls (e.g., Kissinger, Rusk, Rogers, Harriman, Ball and Bundy)
9. Former Presidents: Dr. Brzezinski to telephone former Presidents Ford and Nixon
10. Presidential Candidates: State to contact for individual briefings, principals only, from Saturday am
11. Interested Ethnic Groups: Wexler coordinating calls

#### Notification Calls

1. Select group of key influence leaders only. Calls to begin from 6:00 pm following prior agreement on lists.
2. Talking Points (from NSC) for 5:00 pm Cabinet meeting

#### Other Activities and Follow up

--Materials for constituency mailings next week (Commerce, Agriculture, STR and Labor at their discretion)

--Special WH Operator shift for Friday night/Saturday

--Q&As due 2:00 pm Saturday to McDonald from

--State

--Commerce

--STR

--Agriculture

--Labor

(available to State by late afternoon for transmission to U.S. Embassies abroad)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 4, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM : AL MCDONALD *AM*

SUBJECT: Commercial Sanctions

As you take your difficult decisions today I know you are trying to avoid short term responses whose long term consequences could be disproportionately damaging to our country and practically irreversible except over many years.

This is why the use of commercial policy as a foreign policy tool is so dangerous and questionable except for direct defense items and in case of war. It is impossible to estimate in a few hours or even a few days the long term consequences worldwide of dramatically shifting our commercial policy with the USSR. For this reason, I strongly recommend simply a temporary suspension of shipments (e.g., for 90 days) during a period of general reassessment of our relationship with the Soviet Union. This suspension could apply across the board covering all agricultural and industrial products. Its short term nature could mean only interruption without necessarily severing important commercial relationships either by design or de facto through the moves of others.

Our aim is clearly to hurt the Soviet Union and to teach them a lesson. Our people are willing to pay an appropriate price for that result. After their initial enthusiasm, however, they will not support sacrifices that appear to be greater to us than the direct harm caused by these moves to the Soviets. Our only defensible criteria are that (a) these moves clearly hurt the Soviet Union and (b) they are effective. If they do not meet these tests, or if they are offset by the actions of other countries, public reactions will boomerang negatively.

In the long term, a major, lengthy discontinuance of trade indefinitely with the Soviet Union could require a decade or two to get back to our present situation. This is far more important for foreign relations reasons than commercial ones since our main hope for a peaceful coexistence between our two peoples with such different political systems is the continuity of commercial exchanges. Social and cultural ones cannot do the job, and we have no prospect of bridging our political system.

From our domestic viewpoint, the continuity of our strong economic base, the preservation of the dollar and our standard of living are heavily dependent on our ability to export to cover petroleum imports during the next decade or longer. This is not a spigot we can turn on and off on a short-term basis. In agriculture, the most critical success factor is long-term supplier reliability for foodstuffs. We have not yet fully recovered, even with good friends like Japan, from the soybean embargo of 1973. On the industrial side, the markets are typically not of the short term, bid-auction, commodity type. The most attractive ones demand years of development and investment through collaboration on design and testing of product quality and supplier reliability before reaching stability.

Consequently, unless we define carefully the limits and place our actions in a temporary context, I believe the negatives will soon outweigh any short term benefits from these actions, i.e.:

1. As the long term consequences become better appreciated, your critics will question whether this was indeed an act of a "calm, thoughtful leader" or a precipitous and ill-considered set of overly quick reactions.
2. We may have changed our long term relationship with the Soviet Union onto a irreversible path for many years to come, returning to the same low levels of communication and interchange that existed during the earlier Cold War years.
3. Our people will view the cost of our sacrifices as far greater than the harm done to the Soviet Union, thus a bad deal.
4. Finally, the public does not appreciate the importance of the Soviet action nor will it automatically provide sustained support for costly countermoves. Attacking Afghanistan, a country few of our citizens can spell, is not the same in their minds as attacking Pearl Harbor. They will need a lot of educating and bringing along which we may well be able to do during the course of a 90-day reassessment of our basic relationship with the Soviet Union.

A temporary suspension for a general relationship reassessment could avoid these long-term consequences.

Agreement 6-8 mt/yr  
10/79 up to 25 mt  
215 Commit to buy

42 shipped

US adequate supply

SU 185 mt

Bought 66 wheat (don't need)

15 corn for feed

99% SU consumption

Could get wheat elsewhere

increasing livestock production

20 mil US → 10 mil net  
cut other nations help

Can Aust Argen - wheat

W Europe has barley, etc.

25 cut exports, net 16 mt

Farm income ↓ 3 1/2 B in '80

almost all in feed grain

Have legal auth to embargo  
all > 8 mt

# 175 bil buy } budget  
# 1 target }

Warren + } PL 480  
Lloyd + } 3 mt wheat

US corn vs wheat use

Phosphate, 0.1/geo,

Com/st support

Review business contracts

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1979

PERSONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*

SUBJECT: Proposed Grain Embargo

After reviewing the facts, circumstances, and history surrounding a proposed grain embargo, I would like to recommend strongly against your proposing such action. I will be prepared to describe my reasons in detail at this afternoon's meeting, but I would like to list them briefly in this memorandum:

1. The United States has never imposed a grain embargo to accomplish international political objectives. On one prior occasion, the Indian-Pakistani War in the mid-1960's, President Johnson threatened a cutoff of P.L. 480 shipments to both countries and, I am told, had shipments temporarily stopped. Food is not, in my opinion, an appropriate weapon to use in the international political arena. You specifically excepted food from your Iranian export embargo. If you were to establish such a precedent with Russia, there would be, I am convinced, a strong reaction -- in the Third World, among international groups concerned with hunger, in the U.N. -- against your using the food weapon (especially when none of your predecessors has done so in circumstances at least as alarming).

2. In your campaign you made commitments, announced in Iowa and other places throughout the Midwest, against imposing a grain embargo, unless our national security was at stake. My understanding is that this campaign commitment was one of the many reasons on which you based your decision not to use the food weapon against Iran. We can debate exactly what was meant by your national security exception, but I think the public and the farm belt will believe the exception is being stretched unduly to permit an embargo in the current circumstances. There may be foreign policy but not national security reasons for this action.

Obviously, a campaign promise is not conclusive, but it should be given weight. You made the promise in the context of criticizing Ford for his grain embargoes. Three weeks from today, when the public's attention is no longer on Afghanistan, and that is certainly possible, I believe we would likely see a repetition of the same anger against you which they directed against President Ford.

3. The effect of an embargo on our trade balance would clearly be adverse. Agricultural products are our biggest export, and grain is our most important agricultural export. We are now on the verge of having our current accounts balanced for the first time in many years. That goal would be very difficult to meet if we lose \$3-\$5 billion in foreign sales. Furthermore, this decline in our exports may have some perceptible effect on the dollar's value in foreign markets.

4. It now appears that almost all of the 25 million tons is under contract. Originally, it had been thought that some 7 or 8 million of the tons was not under contract to Russia because no final destination had been set for those tons. The review which has now been done indicates that perhaps 70 percent of those 8 million tons is under contract. In other words, to accomplish a grain embargo at this time, it will be necessary for the government to violate contracts. That is not a precedent we should be setting, even though it may be legal (above the base amount of 8 million tons). Court challenges would be brought, as well.

5. Any effort to mitigate the impact on the farm belt of this action will be very expensive in budget terms and may leave an overhang in the market which will depress wheat and corn prices. Yet some action to offset the drop in farm income would be necessary if an embargo were imposed. This drop in income would come on top of an expected 20% drop in farm income projected for next year. If we were to purchase the grain for the government (for resale or redistribution elsewhere), the cost would be very expensive (\$1.75 billion).

6. A grain embargo would force the Soviet Union to look elsewhere in the future for its grain needs. The Soviets will not soon view us as a reliable supplier, and they can be expected to develop arrangements with other countries to meet their needs. This will, in time, contribute to a decline in foreign markets for our agricultural exports. Similarly damaging might be the effect on other nations. Our credibility as a supplier will be diminished, and our ability and willingness to fulfill international contracts will be questioned. As a result, we can expect some adverse effect on our efforts to promote exports in the 1980's.

7. The impact on the Soviets is unclear. They could replace the wheat portion elsewhere and some (but not all) of the corn. They could liquidate their herds to offset the loss of feedgrain. I believe the political downside is significant. Farmers are very patriotic and are interested in helping in a time of crisis. But when they begin to feel, as they will in a few weeks, the impact on their own households, I think you can expect very severe reaction against a grain embargo. The reaction that Ford met is a reaction you should expect.

8. Any decision you make to ban or limit agricultural exports, if done on "foreign policy" grounds, is subject to a two-house veto. A veto threat can be avoided only by a finding of "national security" grounds. Therefore, advance Congressional consultations on something as unusual and as extreme as a grain embargo are essential. In addition, there is a statutory directive to consult "before imposing export controls".

If you decide to go forward with an embargo, I recommend as strongly that you not do so tonight. I recognize the need to move quickly, and the importance of not appearing hesitant at this time.

But we need to fully think through the economic and legal impacts of an embargo. We should not act prematurely before the facts are all in and fully absorbed.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20250

January 3, 1980

Lloyd N. Cutler, Esquire  
Counsel to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Lloyd,

Enclosed is the memorandum you requested on the legal authority for the President to embargo shipments of grain to the Soviet Union. Also enclosed is the memorandum you requested summarizing the current law governing price supports and reserve policies for corn and wheat.

Howard Hjort will be providing the latest economic data directly to Charlie Schultze.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dan", written in dark ink.

Daniel Marcus

AGREEMENT BETWEEN  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
ON THE SUPPLY OF GRAIN

The Government of the United States of America ("USA") and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR");

Recalling the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" of May 29, 1972;<sup>[1]</sup>

Desiring to strengthen long-term cooperation between the two countries on the basis of mutual benefit and equality;

Mindful of the importance which the production of food, particularly grain, has for the peoples of both countries;

Recognizing the need to stabilize trade in grain between the two countries;

Affirming their conviction that cooperation in the field of trade will contribute to overall improvement of relations between the two countries;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Government of the USA and the Government of the USSR hereby enter into an Agreement for the purchase and sale of wheat and corn for supply to the USSR. To this end, during the period that this Agreement is in force, except as otherwise agreed by the Parties, (i) the foreign trade organizations of the USSR shall purchase from private commercial sources, for shipment in each twelve month period beginning October 1, 1976, six million metric tons of wheat and corn, in approximately equal proportions, grown in the USA; and (ii) the Government of the USA shall employ its good offices to facilitate and encourage such sales by private commercial sources.

<sup>1</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, p. 898.

The foreign trade organizations of the USSR may increase this quantity without consultations by up to two million metric tons in any twelve month period, beginning October 1, 1976 unless the Government of the USA determines that the USA has a grain supply of less than 225 million metric tons as defined in Article V.

Purchases/sales of wheat and corn under this Agreement will be made at the market price prevailing for these products at the time of purchase/sale and in accordance with normal commercial terms.

#### ARTICLE II

During the term of this Agreement, except as otherwise agreed by the Parties, the Government of the USA shall not exercise any discretionary authority available to it under United States law to control exports of wheat and corn purchased for supply to the USSR in accordance with Article I.

#### ARTICLE III

In carrying out their obligations under this Agreement, the foreign trade organizations of the USSR shall endeavor to space their purchases in the USA and shipments to the USSR as evenly as possible over each 12-month period.

#### ARTICLE IV

The Government of the USSR shall assure that, except as the Parties may otherwise agree, all wheat and corn grown in the USA and purchased by foreign trade organizations of the USSR shall be supplied for consumption in the USSR.

#### ARTICLE V

In any year this Agreement is in force when the total grain supply in the USA, defined as the official United States Department of Agriculture estimates of the carry-in stocks of grain plus the official United States Department of Agriculture forward crop

estimates for the coming crop year, falls below 225 million metric tons of all grains, the Government of the USA may reduce the quantity of wheat and corn available for purchase by foreign trade organizations of the USSR under Article I(i).

#### ARTICLE VI

Whenever the Government of the USSR wishes the foreign trade organizations of the USSR to be able to purchase more wheat or corn grown in the USA than the amounts specified in Article I, it shall immediately notify the Government of the USA.

Whenever the Government of the USA wishes private commercial sources to be able to sell more wheat or corn grown in the USA than the amounts specified in Article I, it shall immediately notify the Government of the USSR.

In both instances, the Parties will consult as soon as possible in order to reach agreement on possible quantities of grain to be supplied to the USSR prior to purchase/sale or conclusion of contracts for the purchase/sale of grain in amounts above those specified in Article I.

#### ARTICLE VII

It is understood that the shipment of wheat and corn from the USA to the USSR under this Agreement shall be in accord with the provisions of the American-Soviet Agreement on Maritime Matters <sup>[1]</sup> which is in force during the period of shipments hereunder.

#### ARTICLE VIII

The Parties shall hold consultations concerning the implementation of this Agreement and related matters at intervals of six months beginning six months after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and at any other time at the request of either Party.

<sup>1</sup> TIAS S195; *ante*, p. 2767.

## ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force on execution and shall remain in force until September 30, 1981 unless extended for a mutually agreed period.

DONE at Moscow, this 20<sup>th</sup> day of October, 1975,  
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts  
being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

*Charles W. Robinson* [1]

[SEAL]

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION  
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

*N. Patolichev* [2]

[SEAL]

<sup>1</sup> Charles W. Robinson  
<sup>2</sup> N. Patolichev



# NEWS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Lindell (202) 447-7115

Jenkins (202) 447-4026

## SUPPLY LEVEL SET UNDER U.S.-USSR GRAINS AGREEMENT

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3--The U. S. Department of Agriculture today issued the following statement:

"Officials of the United States and the Soviet Union met here today for the eighth session of regular semiannual consultations under the current US-USSR grain supply agreement. The agreement covers trade in wheat and corn for the period Oct. 1, 1976, through Sept. 30, 1981.

"Based upon supply availability in the United States and anticipated Soviet import requirements, it was agreed that the supply level for U.S. wheat and corn could be up to 25 million tons for the current year of the grain supply agreement between the two countries without the necessity for further consultations.

"Under terms of the agreement, now in its fourth year, the Soviet Union buys at least 6 million tons--half wheat, half corn--of U.S. grain in each of the five years of the agreement. The agreement also requires that purchases above 8 million tons must be preceded by agreement between the two countries on an increased supply level for the year concerned.

"Under Secretary of Agriculture Dale E. Hathaway headed the U.S. delegation at today's consultation. The delegation from Moscow was led by Boris S. Gordeev, Soviet deputy minister of foreign trade.

"At today's session, Soviet officials confirmed that their purchases for the fourth year already total about 8 million tons, and that more purchases are anticipated. It was indicated that the year's total volume would probably be as

-more-

high or higher than that of the past two years, which were about 14.6 million tons in 1977-78 and about 15.7 million tons in 1978-79.

"Although purchases that go above the minimum 6 million ton level may consist of any proportion of wheat and corn, it was indicated that corn would again likely represent a substantially larger portion.

"Hathaway said that the new agreed supply level of 25 million tons takes into account current U.S. supplies and export availabilities as well as anticipated USSR import requirements for the 1979-80 season.

"He said the new supply level does not imply a particular USSR purchase plan at this time, since the actual volume of purchases will depend upon progress of shipments, possible logistical constraints, market conditions, any adverse weather developments that may affect shipping, and other factors.

"Hathaway also indicated that the new supply level and the anticipated increase in shipments to the USSR this season, are expected to have little or no significant impact on the general level of grain prices, since world markets have already recognized a probable rise in world trade and USSR imports from all origins in the year ahead.

"Even if the volume of fourth year trade were to reach the full amount of the newly-agreed supply level, supplies on hand will be adequate to meet other anticipated domestic and export requirements, and maintain sufficient carryover into the 1980-81 season, Hathaway said.

"It was agreed that the two sides would remain in close contact during the interim prior to the next regular session of semi-annual consultations next spring, and that additional consultations would be arranged during the interim if at any time this appeared necessary."



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20250

October 5, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: David M. Schoonover *DMS*

SUBJECT: US-USSR Grain Consultations, October 1979

At grain consultations in Washington on October 3 between delegations led by USDA Under Secretary Dale E. Hathaway and USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Boris S. Gordeev, the Soviets were advised that they could buy up to 25 million metric tons of U.S. wheat and corn during 1979/80 without further consultations. The Soviets said that they would buy more grain than in the past.

Following discussions of U.S. supply situation, principal Soviet concerns evidenced were related to the degree of finality of U.S. 1978/79 and 1979/80 grain and soybean supply and demand estimates and whether special preparations had been made for handling and transport of the expected record quantities of U.S. exports. The principal point by the Soviets concerning their supply situation was that the crop would be better than expected earlier, despite problems in some areas, especially the Ukraine. Deputy Minister Gordeev said that the first reasonably exact assessment of the USSR crop usually is made in early November, but likely will be available about mid-November this year owing to the delayed maturity.

Despite several questions from the U.S. delegation related to the Soviet grain crop outlook, Mr. Gordeev insisted that better information simply was not available.

Under Secretary Hathaway concluded the discussion of crop situations by noting that the U.S. Government feels strongly that sharing of the maximum amount of information on crops is of significant value in enabling the U.S. as prospective suppliers to meet Soviet needs. He expressed hope in the support of the Soviet delegation in working with officials of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture to develop crop forecasts and to share this information.

U.S. and Soviet data on grain shipments during 1978/79 and Soviet purchases for 1979/80 next were compared. Discrepancies in the shipment data for some months were noted, although the annual totals in the two data sets did not greatly differ. The Soviets

offered to make available by the end of October a detailed list of ships and tonnages that could be used in checking the data.

It was agreed that the carryover of grain which had been purchased for shipment in 1978/79 -- the third year of the agreement -- but which remained unshipped, would be counted in data on the third year. Dr. Hathaway noted, however, that the U.S. would like to examine the data on carryover amounts after they had been determined and would be concerned if they were excessive or unusually large in relation to purchases.

Dr. Hathaway noted that scheduled grain shipments for October-December 1979 were relatively low in relation to U.S. expectations of Soviet purchases during the fourth year of the agreement. The Soviet side said that the shipment program for the quarter would be increased either by new purchases or by moving up shipments planned for the first quarter of 1980.

Concerning the reported 8 million tons purchased by the Soviets for 1979/80, Mr. Gordeev noted that they already had purchased about the maximum level of corn permitted prior to consultations. He said that there was no misunderstanding concerning the offer that had been made in the summer to permit larger wheat purchases before additional consultations.

Despite U.S. efforts to obtain any indication of Soviet import intentions during 1979/80, the Soviets declined to provide any signals prior to the U.S. offer of grain availabilities. Deputy Minister Gordeev said that:

- (1) they did not know USSR crop results and how much they would need to buy from the U.S.;
- (2) it would not be in their commercial interest to tell the U.S. their buying intentions, especially if the quantities were large;
- (3) the USSR is not committed under the agreement to provide this information.

Deputy Minister Gordeev said that the USSR would abide by the terms of the agreement. If the U.S. did not offer additional quantities, the USSR would abide by the limits and buy grain elsewhere.

Under Secretary Hathaway said that based on the U.S. supply and demand situation and world market conditions, the U.S. believes it would be possible for the Soviets to buy up to 25 million tons of U.S. wheat and corn without further consultations. He said that if Soviet requirements are markedly different, especially if they are higher, the U.S. assumes that there would be special consultations as soon as the facts are known.

Deputy Minister Gordeev responded that it is difficult to say to what extent the USSR will utilize the offered 25 million tons, but that he was confident the offer would enable the USSR to purchase more than on earlier occasions. He said that Soviet needs would be determined in the not-too-distant future and that he understood well that if more grain is needed that additional consultations are required.

Mr. Gordeev strongly emphasized Soviet approval of the U.S. Government position in implementing the grain agreement. He expressed gratitude for the offer of additional quantities of grain.

Dr. Hathaway said that the agreement is an important element enabling the U.S. to stabilize trade. He said that the exchange of information is useful and expressed hope that it can be improved. He noted that it is important for the U.S. to have adequate information as a basis for determining the domestic farm program. It is the U.S. Government's goal to manage the programs in a manner that will provide reasonable returns to U.S. farmers.

Dr. Hathaway completed his statement by expressing appreciation for the confirmation that higher availability will lead to higher trade because this enables the U.S. to determine farm programs for the next year.

The session concluded with a brief discussion of grain quality issues and was followed by a more detailed discussion at the technical level. Deputy Minister Gordeev said that he would like the delegation heads to hear a report on the technical discussions. Dr. Hathaway responded that U.S. policy seeks to ensure that customers receive the quality they pay for and that he will discuss with Assistant Secretary Smith measures to deal with any problems that are found.

The delegation heads agreed that the next scheduled meeting will be held next May in Moscow.

MEMORANDUM: Price Support, Target Price, and Grain Reserve

Price support for wheat and feed grains as well as other crops such as cotton, rice, peanuts, tobacco, and dairy products is made available to farmers under the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended. Provision is also made in the statute for target price payments for wheat, feed grains, rice, and cotton.

In the case of wheat and corn, the commodities of concern, price support must be made available through loans and purchases at rates not less than the specified statutory minimum [\$2.00 per bushel in the case of corn and \$2.35 per bushel in the case of wheat] and any applicable maximum prescribed by law [100 percent of parity in the case of wheat]. The level of support for each crop for each crop year is determined by the Secretary taking into consideration, among other things, the total stock of such grains and the demand therefor, particularly in export markets. For the 1979 crops, those now being marketed, the level of price support is \$2.35 per bushel for wheat and \$2.00 per bushel for corn. The loan rate for 1980 crop wheat has been established at \$2.50. No level of support has been announced for 1980 crop corn but it will be not less than \$2.00.

Under the program farmers can obtain non-recourse loans on wheat and corn from Commodity Credit Corporation at the rates indicated or they can enter into purchase agreements under which Commodity Credit Corporation agrees to buy these grains at price support level when offered to Commodity Credit Corporation by the farmers. The loans generally mature eleven months after they are made. Under present market conditions loans are usually paid off before they mature because market prices have ranged above the loan rates. For the same reason few purchase agreements are being entered into by farmers. If, however, prices should drop below the level of price support rates the wheat or feed grains could be forfeited to Commodity Credit Corporation in full satisfaction of the loans or delivered under purchase agreements. In such event grain stocks held by the Government would increase substantially.

Target price protection is provided for wheat and corn [as well as well as other feed grains] at levels higher than the levels established for price support purposes. Target prices for these crops are determined from mandated baselines adjusted to reflect changes in cost of production as provided in a statutory formula. Target prices for the 1980 crops of

wheat and corn have not yet been finally determined. If the statutory formula were applied, it is estimated that in the case of wheat, the target price for 1980 would fall in a range between \$3.05 and \$3.15 per bushel. In the case of corn, the 1980 target price would probably be between \$2.05 and \$2.12 per bushel. However, in the case of both crops legislation which has passed the Senate and is probably going to be enacted, would raise the target price for 1980 to \$3.63 per bushel in the case of wheat, <sup>and</sup> to \$2.35 per bushel in the case of corn.

Under the program if the average market price received by farmers during the first five months of the marketing year involved is greater than the applicable target price, no payments are made to the farmers. If the average market price for the five month period is less than the target price but greater than the loan rate a payment is made to participating farmers in the amount of the difference. If the average market price for the period is below the loan rate for the grain involved, then a payment is made to eligible farmers for the difference between the loan rate and the target price. Thus, a participating farmer may receive price protection up to the target price level by participating in both the loan or purchase program and the target price system. If acreage

restrictions are in effect under the set-aside program, farmers must reduce their acreages planted to non-conserving crops to be eligible for loans, purchase agreements and target price payments.

In order to help maintain price levels above the target prices when there is surplus production of wheat or feed grains congress has directed that the Secretary operate a farmer-held grain reserve program. In general, the program offers farmers the opportunity to obtain extended loans of three years duration at price support rates on wheat or feed grains committed to the reserve. Most grain enters the reserve after it has been placed under price support loan. On entry into the reserve the farmer is paid storage charges at the rate of \$0.25 per bushel per year on the quantity in the reserve. By committing the grain to the reserve, the farmer agrees that he will not redeem the grain from the program until the market price for the kind of grain involved reaches the release level specified for that kind of grain. Breach of this agreement may result in the imposition of liquidated damages. Currently, the release level for wheat is 140 percent of the current loan rate or \$3.20 per bushel. The current release level for corn is now 125 percent of the current loan rate or \$2.50 per bushel. In order to induce redemption once the

price reaches these levels, storage payments stop.

If the price of wheat, for example, does not decline after it has reached the release level but continues upward, it may reach the call level. At that point the loans become immediately due and payable and, if not redeemed, the grain would be forfeited to Commodity Credit Corporation. Currently, the call level for wheat is 175 percent of the current loan rate or \$4.11 per bushel. The call level for corn is 140 percent of the current loan rate or \$2.80 per bushel.

Neither corn nor wheat is presently being marketed by farmers at prices above the recalls levels. While there is no statutory limit on the quantity of feed grains which may be placed in the reserve, the quantity of wheat in the reserve may not exceed 700 million bushels.

MEMORANDUM: Legal Authority to Embargo Grain Shipments to the Soviet Union

The Export Administration Act

The President has very broad powers, acting in conjunction with the Secretary of Commerce, under the Export Administration Act of 1979, to restrict or embargo the export of goods, including agricultural commodities. Exports may be embargoed for three reasons: (a) national security; (b) foreign policy; and (c) short supply in the domestic economy. If goods are embargoed for national security reasons, the statute does not require prior consultation with Congress or subsequent reporting to, or approval by, Congress. However, if the embargo is imposed for foreign policy reasons, the President is directed "in every possible instance" to consult with Congress before imposing export controls and to report to Congress immediately after imposing the controls as to the basis for his action.\*

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\*The statute requires the President to "consider" a number of factors in deciding whether to impose export controls for foreign policy purposes: whether controls will achieve their intended purpose; their compatibility with overall foreign policy objectives; the reaction of other countries; the likely effect on the export business of the U.S.; the ability to enforce the controls; and the consequences of not imposing controls.

In addition, in the case of an embargo on exports of agricultural commodities for foreign policy reasons, the statute provides a 30-day period after the President acts within which Congress may, by action of both Houses, overturn the embargo. Of course, the embargo would be effective unless or until Congress acted.

Thus, under the Export Administration Act, the President may act promptly -- either for national security or foreign policy reasons -- to impose an embargo on the export of goods to the Soviet Union.

#### The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement

In the case of shipments of grain to the Soviet Union, however, this generally clear picture is complicated by the provisions of the 1975 agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the supply of wheat and corn to the Soviet Union. On October 20, 1975, the two countries entered into an agreement relating to the sale of wheat and corn to the U.S.S.R. for a 5-year period from October 1976 through September 1981.

Under the basic provision of the agreement (Article I), the Soviet Union agrees to purchase (from private commercial sources) 6 million metric tons of U.S. wheat and corn annually, in approximately equal proportions, and the United States agrees to facilitate and encourage such

sales from private commercial sources. In addition, the Soviet Union at its option may purchase up to 2 million additional metric tons of wheat and corn a year without additional consultation with the United States (unless there is a short supply situation in the United States).

Article VI of the Grain Agreement contemplates that the two countries may agree to additional supply levels in a particular year beyond the 8 million tons covered by Article I. Such a supplementary arrangement was entered into in October of 1979 when -- as a result of discussions between representatives of the two countries -- it was agreed that the United States would facilitate the purchase by the Soviet Union of an additional 17 million tons of wheat and corn (for a total of 25 million tons) during the year beginning October 1979. No limitations were placed on how the additional 17 million tons of purchases would be divided between wheat and corn, but it was understood that the bulk of Soviet purchases would be corn. Current expectations are that the Soviet Union will purchase about 18 million tons of corn and 7 million tons of wheat during the current year (October 1979-September 1980). As of January 1, approximately 4 million tons had already been shipped, with a total of more than 17 million tons already covered by contracts.

In terms of a possible embargo on shipments of grain to the Soviet Union, the important provision of the 1975 agreement is Article II, which provides that the government of the United States "shall not exercise any discretionary authority available to it under United States law to control exports of wheat and corn purchased for supply to the U.S.S.R. in accordance with Article I." The main purpose of Article II may well have been simply to assure that exports to the Soviet Union would not be singled out for embargo in a short supply situation. But it seems clear from the language of this provision, as well as contemporaneous explanations, that Article II represents an undertaking not to use any authority under the Export Administration Act to embargo shipments of wheat and corn to the Soviet Union -- up to the 8 million tons of annual purchases guaranteed by Article I. Both the State Department and the Agriculture Department view this limitation as applying only to the base purchases of 8 million tons annually, and not to additional purchases agreed to under Article VI of the Agreement, such as the additional 17 million tons covered by the October 1979 discussions.

Since the 1975 wheat agreement is not a treaty of the United States, it does not modify or affect domestic United States law. Accordingly, it is the view of the

State Department and the Agriculture Department that even as to the base amount of 8 million tons, an embargo would not result in a violation of United States law as such or create any rights in private parties enforceable under U.S. law. However, an embargo affecting the base amount of 8 million tons might constitute a violation of an international obligation of the United States under the 1975 wheat agreement, unless it could be justified under some supervening principle of international law. In any event, however, the agreement would not be violated by an embargo affecting the 17 million tons of additional shipments covered by the October 1979 discussions.\*

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\*A 1977 amendment to the basic farm legislation requires that price supports be raised to 90% of parity if exports are restricted because of a short supply situation in the United States. This provision would not be triggered, obviously, by an embargo imposed for national security or foreign policy purposes. But it does reflect a Congressional concern about the impact of embargoes on farm prices and makes it likely that any embargo action would generate pressure to invoke this provision or to take other action to raise price supports.



January 3, 1980

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Stuart E. Eizenstat  
FROM : Homer E. Moyer, Jr. *Hm*  
SUBJECT : Maritime Implications of Grain Embargo

The attached memo summarizes the extent of U.S. maritime participation in grain shipments to the Soviet Union and the recent history of longshoremen refusals to load cargo destined for Communist countries.

In a word, the impact of halting grain shipments on American shipping would be minimal. More importantly, time is of the essence on a decision on a grain embargo, for a decision by the longshoremen could effectively preempt the President and make his decision in some respects moot.

cc: Joseph Onek, Esq.

## MEMORANDUM FOR:

Subject: Maritime Considerations Involved in Halting Grain Shipments to the U.S.S.R.

In considering various options relating to the curtailment of grain shipments to the U.S.S.R. two areas of inquiry should be pursued. The first is the status of such shipments and the impact any curtailment would have on the U.S., U.S.S.R. and third-country fleets. And, secondly, the history of some of the boycott actions of the International Longshoremen's Union (ILA) in certain trades and the likelihood of such activity in the future.

Status of Grain Shipments to the U.S.S.R.

Between January and September 1979, the U.S. shipped a total of 13,738,349 metric tons of grain to the U.S.S.R. Of this total, 321,466 tons (2.3%) were carried by U.S.-flag vessels; 2,853,212 tons (20.8%) by Soviet flag ships; and, 10,563,671 tons (76.9%) by third-flag carriers. Similarly in 1978, a total of 14,415,800 metric tons of grain were shipped to the Soviet Union. U.S.-flag vessels carried 505,500 tons (3.5%); Soviet flag vessels carried 3,192,000 tons (22.1%); and, third-flag vessels carried 10,718,300 tons (74.4%). Prior to 1978, U.S.-flag vessels had generally carried more grain to the Soviet Union than did Soviet vessels. However, demands for U.S.-flag tanker tonnage in the Alaskan trade saw a shift in employment of U.S.-flag vessels to that trade, thus leaving the carriage of grain in the Soviet grain trade mainly to Soviet and third-flag tonnage.

The current contracted sale of 23 million tons of grain to the U.S.S.R. form approximately 12.8% of that country's 1979 production and is a significant demand which the Soviets would seek to have met elsewhere if shipments were terminated. From a shipping standpoint, third-flag vessels currently employed in its trade would have to seek employment elsewhere, as would Soviet vessels presently engaged in the trade. This displacement could have a significant impact on the world charter market. The result would likely be unemployment for many vessels and substantially depressed world charter rates. Much of the third-flag tonnage, perhaps as much as 25%-30%, currently employed in this trade is time chartered to the Soviet Union until June 1980. Should grain shipments be halted, therefore, the Soviets, not the owners of these vessels, would suffer severe financial losses. There would be little impact on U.S.-flag operators resulting from any curtailment of shipments. Furthermore, the stoppage of sales to the U.S.S.R. would not violate any provision of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. maritime agreement.

#### Boycott of Soviet Grain Sales by the ILA

In the 1963-64 sales of grain to the Soviet Union, the most troublesome roadblock to shipping wheat to the Soviet Union was the refusal of the International Longshoremen's Union (ILA) to load such cargoes in U.S. Gulf and East Coast ports. The ILA, which historically maintained a strong anti-Communist position,

demonstrated this refusal in late January 1964 after the Continental Grain Company had asked the Maritime Administration to waive the U.S.-flag requirement on the sale of grain to the Soviets, claiming it had been able to contract less than half of 494,000 long tons of U.S.-flag vessels that were needed to comply with a 50% U.S.-flag requirement. American shipowners and labor unions strongly opposed the waiver requests and the ILA called a boycott on loading Soviet cargoes. Finally after a month of negotiations, Federal officials and labor leaders reached agreement and shipments were allowed to proceed.

Similarly in June 1971, just prior to the rescission of the 1963 Presidential Order requiring the use of U.S.-flag vessels in the carriage of grain sold to the U.S.S.R., James Gleason, President of the ILA, told White House officials that the ILA would not load any vessels bound for the Soviet Union. Gleason obtained the support of other U.S. maritime leaders and secured a protest letter from George Meany, then President of the AFL-CIO, which was sent to the President on June 15, 1971. Finally, in early November 1971, White House and maritime labor leaders agreed on a plan to seek the negotiation of a cargo sharing agreement with the Soviet Union and the ILA lifted its opposition to the shipment of grain to the U.S.S.R.

In July 1975 the ILA delegates at their national convention voted to refuse to load American and Canadian grain on vessels destined to the Soviet Union. In August 1975, George Meany said that American longshoremen would not load any more grain on ships bound

for the Soviet Union until steps were taken "to protect the American consumer and also the American shipping industry". Longshoremen walked off the job in Beaumont, Houston and New Orleans. On August 19, 1975, a U.S. District Court judge signed a temporary restraining order directing longshoremen to resume loading the wheat in West Gulf ports. On September 5, 1975, a U.S. District Court judge in New Orleans issued a permanent injunction concluding that the boycott was a violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the ILA and the steamship association. Finally, on September 9, 1975, Mr. Meany agreed to end the boycott. It should be noted that in a different but related situation involving the ILA's refusal to load a British-flag ship (TULSE HILL) in Baltimore in 1964 because the vessel had been to Cuba, a Federal court judge ruled that the ILA action was appropriate because longshoremen couldn't be required to do work they considered obnoxious, even for political reasons.

The ILA has historically taken unilateral action with respect to boycotts that complemented the views of its membership, such as action which is currently underway with respect to shipments to Iran (see Attachment 1). One cannot discount the possibility that such action could occur in the present instance, especially in view of the fact that little economic harm would come to the U.S.-flag merchant fleet from a boycott. Obviously such unilateral

labor action would not yield the political benefit to the Administration that might result from the stoppage of grain sales to the U.S.S.R. by the U.S. Government. In light of this fact, any decision concerning termination of grain movements to the U.S.S.R. should be considered at the earliest possible time.

LONGSHORE (ILA) BOYCOTTS

- 4/13/60 - Longshoremen refused to work the United Arab Republic vessel CLEOPATRA. Vessel picketed by the SIU in retaliation for boycotted and blacklisted vessels carrying Israeli cargo or calling at Israeli ports.
- 1961 - ILA refuses to handle any cargo shipped either to or from Cuba.
- 1962 - ILA boycotted the Spanish vessel GUADALUPE because of dealings with Cuba and the Soviet Union.
- 10/17/62 - ILA refused to unload Soviet made cargo aboard the Finnish flag vessel "FINNPULP."
- 10/13/62 - ILA instructed its members not to load any Orient Mid-East vessels in U.S. ports because some were engaged in Cuban trade.
- 11/63 - ILA Local 824 refused to handle Soviet cargo aboard the JOH. GORTON, a Swedish-Flag vessel.
- 1/21/64 - ILA refused to load the S.S. TULSE HILL, the former Cuban-trading ship when it stopped in Baltimore (bound for England).
- 2/17/64 - ILA stopped loading wheat for shipment to the Soviet Union despite urgent appeals from Washington.
- 2/25/66 - ILA Local 824 picketed Cunard Piers 92-94 - New York. Protested English ships carrying cargo to North Vietnam. (QUEEN MARY at 92 and ALAUNIA at 94.)
- 3/5/66 - ILA picketed French Line Pier 83 protesting French ships carrying cargo to North Vietnam.
- 2/24/68 - Longshoremen supported the striking AFL-CIO copper unions by refusing to handle copper imports.
- 1968 - In interview with Journalist, Victor Riesel, ILA President Thomas Gleason allegedly advocated labor action against Swedish cargo and vessels because of Swedish acceptance and handling of American deserters.
- 1971 - ILA indicated intention to boycott Soviet grain sales.
- 1975 - ILA announced refusal to load Soviet vessels and longshoremen walked off job in Beaumont, Houston and New Orleans.
- 1979-80 - ILA implemented de facto boycott of cargoes destined for Iran.