

**5/19/80 [3]**

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

cc Jack  
I like it -  
J  
5/15/80

Mr. President:

Since my speech in Detroit

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
5/19/80

Jack Watson

The attached was received in  
our office and is forwarded  
to you for your information.

Rick Hutcheson

Economic  
couple  
meeting  
hops you  
I hope  
deep

meeting  
& was  
each time  
run a lot

11/7/80  
Jack

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5/18/80

Jack Watson  
Arnie Miller

The attached was returned in  
the President's outbox today  
and is forwarded to you for  
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 16, 1980

C

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JACK WATSON *Jack*  
ARNIE MILLER *HF*

SUBJECT:

Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) - PAS

The FCSC is a three-member agency that processes and adjudicates claims of U.S. citizens who have lost property either during a war or by expropriation by a foreign government. In December, you approved the nomination of Blair Lee III as the third Member. Governor Lee declined the nomination for personal reasons. We join Chairman Richard Yarborough in recommending Ralph W. Emerson, of Washington, D. C.

Mr. Emerson (47) is Chairman and President of a public corporation which owns 18 restaurants in the Washington, D. C. metropolitan area. He has been active in the business and political communities in Washington, D.C. and Tennessee. He was graduated from East Tennessee State University with a Bachelor of Science degree, and earned his law degree from Stamford University.

The Commission needs someone with a solid background in property appraisal. Emerson served as State Property Administrator of Tennessee and was a Member of the Executive Committee of the National Association of State Planners and Developers. His legal background and demonstrated expertise in property assessment will complement the strengths of Chairman Yarborough and Commissioner Jung.

Frank Moore concurs in the following recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION

Nominate Ralph Waldo Emerson, of Washington, D. C., to be a Member of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.

approve  disapprove

RALPH WALDO EMERSON  
Washington, D. C.

EXPERIENCE

1976 - Date President, Chairman of the Board  
Emersons, Ltd.

1972 - Date U.S. Bank Note (formerly Mid-Con Industries)

1972 - Date General Counsel  
1976 - Date Executive Vice President for  
Western States

1979 - Date Attorney  
Emerson & Emerson  
Johnson, Tennessee

1971 - 1972 Consultant  
U.S. House of Representatives, Small Business  
Committee

1970 Candidate for Governor of Tennessee

1969 - 1970 Private law practice  
Emerson & Radnay  
Washington, D. C.

1967 - 1969 Administrative Assistant  
Office of Congressman Ray Blanton  
U.S. House of Representatives

1964 - 1966 Commissioner of Commerce  
State of Tennessee

1958 - 1964 State Property Administration Office  
Nashville, Tennessee

State Property Administrator  
Assistant State Property Administrator  
Tax Attorney

EDUCATION

1958 Stamford University, Birmingham, Alabama, J.D.  
1958 Cumberland University, Bachelor of Law  
1957 East Tennessee State University, B.S.

PERSONAL

White Male  
Age 47  
Democrat

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5/18/80

Jack Watson  
Arnie Miller

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Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

C

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JACK WATSON *Jack*  
ARNIE MILLER *AM*

SUBJECT:

U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) - Designation  
of Chair and Vice Chair

Chair

In December, you designated Catherine Bedell as Chair for the remainder of the Republican term expiring in June. We recommend the designation of William R. Alberger, of Oregon, for the two-year Democratic term.

You appointed Alberger to the ITC in 1977, and in 1978 he was designated Vice Chair. He has a thorough knowledge of the Commission's internal operations, and is regarded as an excellent manager. His prior experience includes serving as Administrative Assistant of the House Ways and Means Committee (1977), and as a staff member to Congressman Al Ullman (1972 - 1977).

Vice Chair

The ITC statute requires the designation of a Vice Chair whose political affiliation differs from the Chair's. We join Commissioner Alberger in recommending the designation of Michael J. Calhoun, an Independent. You appointed Calhoun last year. He has quickly earned the respect of his colleagues and demonstrated his ability to assume this responsibility. Prior to his appointment, Calhoun served as Assistant Minority Counsel for International Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee.

Stu, Henry Owen, Reubin Askew and Frank Moore join in the following recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Designate William R. Alberger, of Oregon, as Chair of the U.S. International Trade Commission, for a term of two years.

approve  disapprove

Designate Michael J. Calhoun, of Washington, D. C., as Vice Chair of the U.S. International Trade Commission, for a term of two years.

approve  disapprove

BILL ALBERGER  
Oregon

EXPERIENCE

1977 - Date	Member International Trade Commission
1977	Administrative Assistant Committee on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representatives
1975 - 1977	Administrative Assistant Congressman Al Ullman U.S. House of Representatives
1972 - 1975	Legislative Assistant Congressman Al Ullman U.S. House of Representatives
1969 - 1971	Legislative Assistant (Part-time) Senator Bob Packwood U.S. Senate

EDUCATION

1973	Georgetown Law Center, J.D.
1969	University of Iowa, M.B.A.
1967	Willamette University, B.A.

PERSONAL

White Male  
Age 34  
Democrat

MICHAEL J. CALHOUN  
Washington, D.C.

EXPERIENCE

1979 -	Date	Member International Trade Commissioner
1976 -	1979	Assistant Minority Counsel for International Trade Committee on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representatives
1974 -	1976	Associate Covington and Burling Washington, D.C.
1973	(Summer)	Summer Associate Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy New York City
1972	(Summer)	Law Clerk Lawrence Prattis Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
1970 -	1971	Faculty Member Oakwood School Poughkeepsie, New York

EDUCATION

1975		London School of Economics (One-year post-graduate law program in international economics)
1974		Harvard Law School, J.D.
1970		Princeton University, B.A.
1966 -	1968	United States Air Force Academy

PERSONAL

Black Male  
Age 35  
Independent

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5/19/80

Frank Moore / Ev Small

The attached was returned in  
the President's outbox today  
and is forwarded to you for  
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1980

*Frank J*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK MOORE *F.M.*  
SUBJECT: H.R. 5200, THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS  
ACT OF 1980

I have attached, for your approval, the text of a letter we would like to send (on Monday) from you to all of the Members of the House, urging their approval of the Fair Housing Amendments Act. This bill is scheduled for the House floor on Tuesday.

Some groups remain concerned about the commitment of the Administration to this legislation. Your letter will reinforce our strong support for the bill.

HUD and DPS agree that it should be sent. The speechwriters have edited the letter.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1980

Dear Congressman/woman \_\_\_\_\_:

In the next few days, you will be considering H.R. 5200, the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1980. This is perhaps the most important civil rights bill to reach the floor of the House in over a decade.

The purpose of this act is to allow the Department of Housing and Urban Development for the first time to hold administrative hearings on housing discrimination cases. Establishment of such an administrative enforcement procedure would provide for more expeditious and equitable review of cases and for more vigorous enforcement of current fair housing law. It would strengthen the power of the Attorney General and the Secretary and other officials at HUD in enforcing the law on behalf of individuals and groups. In addition, it would improve the cooperative enforcement capabilities of Federal, State, and local government agencies and would give those local fair housing agencies more responsibility by directing HUD to refer appropriate discrimination cases to them.

The House Judiciary Committee passed H.R. 5200 by a strong four-to-one margin after months of careful and deliberate refinement. Bipartisan support and thoughtful analysis have characterized every stage of its development. I urge you to approve this act and help make fair housing a reality for all Americans.

Sincerely,

The Honorable \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 15, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT LIPSHUTZ *RL*

SUBJECT:

Middle East Matters: United Nations  
Vote on Resolution 465

Attached is a letter from Leon Charney and a memorandum concerning this matter.

I have discussed this matter briefly with Hamilton Jordan, Alfred Moses and Ambassador Sol Linowitz.

I urge that you and Secretary of State Muskie give this matter serious consideration at the present time.

Attachments

*Law Offices*  
LEON H. CHARNEY  
*One State Street Plaza*  
*New York, N.Y. 10004*

R. J. S.

LEON H. CHARNEY  
ROBERT A. RUBENFELD  
(N. Y. AND N. J. BARS)

(212) 422-7550  
CABLE: INTLSPORTS

May 8, 1980

Robert J. Lipshutz, Esq.  
Haas, Holland, Levison & Gibert  
2300 Harris Tower - Peachtree Center  
233 Peachtree Street, N.E.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Bob:

I am sure you recall that I was in Israel when the United States did not veto the U.N. Security Council Resolution 465. It is public record that there was an unbelievable and vociferous outcry from and amongst the "Jewish vote" in the United States. At that time, the then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance announced to the world that it was his error in communicating with the President that caused Ambassador McHenry to allow the U.N. Resolution to pass.

Subsequently, the President announced that he disavowed the vote in the U.N. Upon disavowing the vote, the President was instantly subject to immense criticism. Many people claim that the only reason the President disavowed the vote was because he was involved in the New York State primary against Senator Kennedy, and that there was an excellent possibility that the so-called "Jewish vote" would go against him and ruin his chances in New York State.

I and my friends in Israel had no problem believing the President's version in the error in communication, and that had all the facts been related to him correctly, he would have vetoed the Resolution.

There remains, however, the following question:

"If the President in the first <sup>Instance</sup> ~~question~~ would not have voted for the Resolution, then why has he only disavowed the Resolution and not expunge the same from the record?"

LEON H. CHARNEY

Robert A. Lipshutz, Esq.  
May 8, 1980  
Page Two.

Without having the President expunge the same from the record, an inference arises, that the only reason this disavowal took place was because of political considerations in the United States, and that the only purpose for the disavowal was a political one. I do not believe this, nor my friends, for in reality, the President caused more political problems for himself for calling for a disavowal than if he had done nothing.

It is my belief that the average person concerned with the President's credibility takes the position that a person who makes a mistake, corrects his mistake. If this was an honest error and there was no intention that the United States be part of this Resolution, why not expunge the entire record and resolution from the record? If the record is not expunged, then there remains the nagging doubts in the minds of many that the President was not telling the truth and that it was merely a political move to placate the "Jewish vote", that in reality, the President wished to have the resolution go forward.

CONCLUSION

1. Therefore, it is my opinion that the U.N. vote must be expunged first and foremost to keep the President's credibility untarnished.
2. Attached hereto are political reasons why the President, in my opinion, must expunge the U.N. vote.

If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to call. Warmest regards.

Sincerely,



LEON H. CHARNEY

R. J. S.  
May 16, 1980

TOPIC: Current Political Reasons Why the President  
Should Have the U.N. Vote Expunged

Here are some points in justifying why the U. S. should formally register its disavowal or repudiation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 465, adopted unanimously on March 1, 1980:

1. There is widespread confusion both among U.N. members as well as within the public at large about the exact nature of the U.S. position to Resolution 465. President Carter has insisted that the U.S. affirmative vote was a mistake based on a failure in communications in instructing Ambassador McHenry. But, other U.S. officials including former Secretary of State Vance have indicated that the Resolution was indeed consistent with U.S. policy but was repudiated largely for domestic political considerations. Formally notifying the U.N. Security Council in written documentation that the U.S. rejects Resolution 465 would go a long way towards clarifying the American position.
2. Several members of the U.N. Security Council including American-European allies have been led to believe by some U.S. officials, not to take seriously President Carter's disavowal of the Resolution. By refusing to formally convey America's position to the Security Council, these members are encouraged to believe that the U.S. did not err when voting in favor of the Resolution.
3. Some Western Europeans have been led to believe that their current initiative undertaken to change U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 by recognizing Palestinian self-determination might eventually win U.S. support. The ambiguous and conflicting signals recently sent by various U.S. officials have tended to

encourage this line of thinking, for within the American-Jewish Community, there are still many lingering doubts of the real nature of the U.S. position. These doubts have remained because of the State Department's refusal to formally correct the diplomatic record at the U.N. Many people are asking:

"If the vote was a mistake, why has not the U.S. officially informed the U.N. of that mistake?"

4. In the official record of the U.N., the U.S. voted in favor of Resolution 465, but there are many examples when votes are corrected after U.N. missions received further instructions from their governments. Under such circumstances, the formal roll-call vote is always followed by an asterisk noting the corrected position of countries which change their votes. This is a formal procedure and such asterisk always follows in the mention of that roll-call on that particular vote. In the diplomatic record of the U.N., the U. S. is still on record as having supported that Resolution.
5. As an even-handed and fair mediator in Arab-Israel peace negotiations, the U.S. must continue to have the confidence of all sides. Certainly, Washington's position has been compromised by its refusal to officially correct since there are serious doubts in Israelis' minds of these U.S. positions.
6. Only these past few days, as U.N. Council members were drafting a new resolution to condemn Israel's expulsion of three Palestinians from the West Bank, several U.N. members sought to indicate a reference in the new draft resolution to the earlier Resolution 465. The U.S. pressed against any such inclusion but clearly found itself in an awkward position since it never formally corrected the diplomatic record. By doing so, the U.S. would avoid needless squabbles when drafting future resolutions.

#### CONCLUSION

If the Resolution was indeed a mistake, why has not the U.N. officially been informed of it?

**Report to the President**

# **America's Small Business Economy**

## **Agenda for Action**

**By the White House Commission on Small Business  
April 1980**

**Electrostatic Copy Made  
for Preservation Purposes**

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1980

Phone Call -  
Sunday, 9:15 p.m.

Lone  
J

Mr. President -

re: Phone call to Hubert Humphrey Institute  
Fundraiser Sunday evening.

The call will be initiated from Worcester, Ma. to the White House approximately 9:15 p.m.

The program is a gala (no dinner) with continuous entertainment and speeches running from 7 - 10:00 p.m.

The first person you will speak to is Dick Deerin who is Mondale's Advance person for the event. Your conversation with him will not be over the Speaker system. He will give you your cue as to when the Speaker system will be turned on.

At that point, you may say hello to Muriel Humphrey and the Vice President. Both will be able to speak with you (all three voices will be heard throughout the audience). After a brief hello to them, you should proceed with the remarks that have been prepared for you.

Your call will come after Secretary Muskie has spoken and departed but before former President Ford's remarks and the Vice President's remarks.

There are several Governors present including Brennan, King, Gallen & Snelling - Senators Leahy & Pell and several Ambassadors. Many State and Local officials will also be present so I do not think you should attempt to recognize them individually.

fran  
fran

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for Preservation Purposes**

Bob Rackleff  
Draft A-1; 5/15/80  
Scheduled Delivery:  
Sun, May 18, 8 PM

Telephone Tribute to Hubert Humphrey

Thank you, Muriel, and friends of Hubert Humphrey:

I want to join you in the spirit of this evening and in  
your support of the Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs.

Few things would please him more than knowing we are helping

young people, <sup>to</sup> continue their education and, <sup>to</sup> become better

prepared to serve society, *as Hubert served society.*

We are carrying on Hubert's work, and there is no higher  
honor we can bestow on a friend who gave so generously, *of himself*

Shortly before he died, Hubert shared two of his last,  
precious days with me. We spent a weekend together at Camp  
David, mostly in front of a fireplace, talking and listening.

*H most of talking  
I most of listening*

We talked about people, ordinary people and ~~the great~~; <sup>famous ones;</sup>  
about our country; about the world, the overriding need for  
peace and security; and about faith in others and <sup>faith</sup> in God.

He shared with me a lifetime of hoping, of learning,  
of loving. He saw the world in terms of its human needs.  
Nobody else in politics could communicate so humanly <sup>about</sup> what  
needed to be done.

He also saw life in terms of the joy of the struggle,  
the joy of work, life and hope. Defeat was simply one more  
opportunity to try again.

Those two days were an unforgettable experience. But  
it was just <sup>typical</sup> ~~one~~ of many lessons we learned [~~in many ways~~] from  
him. We must never forget to pass <sup>the lessons</sup> ~~them~~ on to succeeding  
generations.

He did not want to be remembered with cold monuments,

but with good works. That is what we are doing tonight.

We should all continue those works, as if Hubert were looking over our shoulders, urging us on, and prodding us also to be *optimistic, to be* of good cheer.

The Institute is only one part, <sup>a</sup> small but vital <sup>part,</sup> of our living memory of Hubert Humphrey. I thank you for helping tonight, and for the countless ways <sup>we have</sup> ~~you are~~ honoring him in <sup>our</sup> ~~your~~ daily lives.

*Mustel God bless you -  
We loved him & we love you -*

# # #

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 16, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

STU EIZENSTAT *SE*

As I indicated to you this morning, the EPG strongly felt that you should continue to wage the battle on the fee in court and in the Congress, and should not attempt at this time to alter the nature of the proposed fee or to divert attention from the issue with new legislative proposals.

Our view was that any of the options concerning possible modification of the fee carried far greater dangers than benefits. Obviously, when a final decision is made in the courts we will review our recommendation; that may not occur for another 2-3 weeks. Until then, we recommend proceeding on course. We will intensify our Congressional effort through public outreach, increased press focus, and Cabinet-level lobbying. We will not send the gasoline tax to the Congress during this period.

The only dissent from the EPG recommendation was expressed by Al McDonald and Bob Thomson, who felt that the proclamation should be revised to eliminate the tilt of the fee to gasoline (which appeared to be Judge Robinson's main objection). The EPG disagreed with that view because it (i) violated the express policy stated at the time the initial proclamation was issued; (ii) would make the court feel its ruling was being improperly circumvented; and (iii) the strongest Congressional supporters for the fee (like the Speaker) would strongly oppose a fee that could increase heating oil as well. Finally, Charlie Schultze indicated that the CPI would not be able to segregate the effects of the fee, for the costs would be passed along in feedstocks and other difficult to measure areas.

The attached memorandum was prepared for this morning's EPG discussion, and it sets forth the pros and cons of the various options considered. While it is not essential for you to read it, I thought you might want the opportunity to look at it in order to get a fuller sense of the basis of the EPG recommendation.

Attachment

**Electrostatic Copy Made  
for Preservation Purposes**

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 15, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EPG  
FROM: EPG DEPUTIES (BY RUBENSTEIN)

The EPG Deputies met today to review the policy options available on the gasoline conservation fee. This memorandum discusses each of those options and presents the pro and con arguments that were made.

The consensus of the Deputies was that none of the options suggesting a change in our current course was preferable to keeping the existing Proclamation in force, attempting to uphold that Proclamation in court, and going all out to fight Congressional attempts to override the Proclamation. The best way to proceed along that route was also discussed, and a consensus of the Deputies was that a much more visible, better coordinated White House-Department of Energy effort was needed to explain our position on the fee and to secure enough votes to sustain a veto. Specifics about how this might be done are discussed following the pro and con discussion of each of the policy options.

I

POLICY OPTIONS

1. Keep existing Proclamation; continue the legal and Congressional effort to sustain it.

Pro:

- o Current position on the fee is clear and understandable; the public and the Congress can be educated about it.
- o The existing coalition of support for the fee can be maintained; almost any change in course will likely upset and lose part of this coalition.
- o The prospect of winning in court is at least 50-50; no way exists to revise the Proclamation and guarantee a better chance of upholding the revised Proclamation in court.

- o Senator Byrd believes that a concerted effort can enable us to sustain a veto in the Senate; a change in positions might lead to a different conclusion by Byrd.
- o Any change in position will subject the Administration to criticism for being unwilling to fight for its positions; will reopen charges that the Administration's policies shift too quickly.

Con:

- o A favorable court decision, which certainly cannot be guaranteed, would probably come so late that the economic impact of the fee will occur at precisely the wrong time.
  - o Even if a veto could be sustained in the Senate, the Administration will be required to go through a bruising battle with the Congress; that will not only impair our relations with a number of key Members but will also force us to concentrate needed resources on a veto fight, leaving other important matters to die.
2. Revise the Proclamation in a way that will impose a fee but not require that it be recovered solely through gasoline.

Pro:

- o If accepted by the judge as legal, would permit the fee to go into effect almost immediately and permit collection of revenues to occur.
- o The fee would be in effect while Congress attempted to override it; by the time a final veto fight occurred, enough time may have passed to minimize the outrage in Congress at the fee.
- o The fee would be placed almost entirely on gasoline for at least the next several months, for there is no market during that period for home heating oil.
- o Provides the President with a decisive action to take to accomplish his energy objective and to deal with pressing legal and Congressional problems.

Con:

- o DOE's General Counsel believes that this action, while perhaps ultimately sustainable in the courts, would be viewed by Judge Robinson to be covered by the existing injunction; Justice lawyers disagree, and believe Judge Robinson might well accept this action as consistent with his opinion.
  - o This course would reverse our basic policy decision of March -- that the impact of the fee would be felt solely on gasoline, and not on heating oil and other products.
  - o The Northeast would be particularly hard hit by this action, and the Speaker could not be expected to continue his support.
  - o OPEC would probably be very upset, for it has traditionally opposed the fee, and it sanctioned the initial one in large part because of its direct connection to gasoline prices.
  - o It is unlikely that the Congress would be slowed very much in its effort to overturn the fee; a new resolution of disapproval would have to be passed by the Ways and Means Committee, but that would not likely take very long.
- 3    Revise Proclamation to retain the tilt to all gasoline, but do so through the procedural requirements of the Energy Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA).

Pro:

- o Permits President's critical program to go into effect.
- o Deals with the procedural objection of Judge Robinson.

Con:

- o The President could legally take this action under the EPAA, but it is not yet clear how quickly this could be done.
- o In any event, Judge Robinson would likely find this action inconsistent with his order during the pendency of the appeal.

## 4. Decontrol gasoline prices.

Pro:

- o Will deal directly with the energy conservation purpose behind the fee.
- o The current gasoline supply situation would not cause an undue increase in gasoline prices at least for several months.
- o This action is much more likely to be upheld in the courts and much more likely to withstand Congressional override.

Con:

- o Because of the slack in the gasoline market, the immediate conservation impact would probably be less than a fee.
- o The revenues raised by a fee would be lost to the Federal government, if the fee were dropped at the same time as gasoline was decontrolled (and that would probably have to be done).
- o Would be an extremely unpopular action with our basic Democratic constituency.
- o Is really an option to be considered separately from the determination of how to handle the fee. Decontrol should be considered on its own merits.

The above options are evaluated in the context of the Administration's taking immediate action. After a final court decision, or more conclusive Congressional action, the options might be re-evaluated.

## II

As indicated above, the EPG Deputies recommend pursuing Option 1. In our view, each of the other options has serious flaws and will not solve the basic problem now facing us. However, the EPG Deputies do believe that decontrol should be considered on its own (but just not as an alternative to the fee at this time) and that the gasoline tax should be sent to the Congress rapidly (but not as an alternative to our fight on the fee).

In addition, the EPG Deputies recommend that:

- o The White House effort to publicize the fee be intensified; that preparation be made for a veto override fight; that the President become more actively involved in a public way in fighting for the fee.
- o The Administration indicate quickly its resolve to make a major fight of the fee and to resist any efforts to thwart the fee, in court or in Congress; an early threat of veto should be seriously considered.
- o Secretary Muskie should make a public statement upon his return from Europe about the concern of our allies that we are abandoning the fight for energy conservation.
- o Consideration be given to whether and how we should indicate the revenues from the fee will be expended (the EPG Deputies strongly feel that the fee can be won if we can indicate how the revenues will be used, though the tactics about how that indication should be given must be carefully developed.
- o Consideration be given to whether the gasoline tax and/or the rationing plan be sent immediately to Congress, in order to intensify the pressure on Congress to take favorable action on the fee.