

12/18/80

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The Atlanta Journal / THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION

..... 51

Celeste gives Peace Corps new life



The Associated Press

Celeste brought corps out of a crisis

By DOUGLAS LOWENSTEIN

Journal-Constitution Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Like others, the man was having difficulty defining the contributions made by former Ohio Lt. Gov. Richard Celeste during his 17-month tenure as director of the Peace Corps.

He kept speaking of intangibles: Celeste raised morale, restored identity and independence, revived enthusiasm. Finally, realizing he wasn't making his point, the official told an anecdote.

Celeste was barnstorming through Africa not too long ago visiting Peace Corps projects. Each day, there were six or eight stops. And each day his African hosts watched in open-mouthed awe as Celeste indiscriminantly and enthusiastically wolfed down every local food delicacy put before him.

The Africans loved it. The Peace Corps volunteers loved it. And Celeste loved it.

"You see, what Celeste has done is brought an overall sense of excitement, mission and vision back to the Peace Corps," the observer concluded.

Applied to another agency, such accomplishments might seem trivial. But at an agency which has gained its driving force from such intangible qualities as idealism, Celeste's work is highly valued.

"His enthusiasm is contagious," was how another source put it. "He believes in what the Peace Corps has stood for and he exudes it like a good politician. And that's truly important, especially with this agency."

When Celeste came to the Peace Corps in June 1979, the agency was in crisis. Sam Brown, director of ACTION, the Peace Corps parent agency, had complete control over the Peace Corps budget, personnel and programs.

In addition, Brown and outgoing Peace Corps director Carolyn Payton had carried on a bitter, acrimonious and very demoralizing public squabble over the type of programs the Peace Corps would undertake in the Third World.

At the time, observers called it a "snake pit" or a "hornet's nest." Recalling such descriptions recently, Celeste said, "A lot of people thought the Peace Corps was going down the tubes. This was a dispirited place, people were at each other."

"But I feel good about the last year and a half. We were able to fashion a more autonomous Peace Corps, to bring back authority to the Peace Corps director to shape the budget and personnel, to build morale and to begin to increase the sense of visibility and (establish) a sense of direction for the '80s."

His own evaluation is shared by congressmen with a deep interest in the Peace Corps. Last April, during House Foreign Affairs Committee review of the Peace Corps budget for fiscal year 1981, Rep. Don Bonker, a moderate Democrat from Washington, praised the Ohioan for "a superb first year" as Peace Corps director.

The praise came despite the fact that Celeste was given little money to implement his ideas. In 1979, the Peace Corps' budget was

\$99 million. Two years later, despite rampant inflation overseas, it was just \$105 million.

"Dick Celeste has been cheated of a great deal in terms of what he could have done by lack of funds," said one Peace Corps insider. "He had far more ideas than he could implement."

The bill authorizing foreign aid spending for the current year includes \$118 million for the Peace Corps, a level even higher than that requested by President Carter. To a degree, this reflects the continued strong bipartisan support enjoyed by the agency, in sharp contrast to their foreign economic assistance programs. But congressional sources also say that Celeste's effective politicking was instrumental in securing the funding increase.

There is generally a lot of good will for the Peace Corps. But Celeste had an ability to galvanize that in a way that represented a substantial financial increase for the agency at a time when foreign assistance programs in general were in disrepute.

The fight over Peace Corps autonomy was viewed as the crucial test of Celeste's commitment to the Peace Corps. The agency's allies believe that it can succeed only if it retains an individual identity and visibility, which they say would be impossible if it were submerged in ACTION.

Most observers believe Celeste has largely succeeded in reasserting control over the Peace Corps programs, budget and personnel from Brown and ACTION.

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9:50 a.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 17, 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GENE EIDENBERG *Gene*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dick Celeste
Thursday, December 18, 1980
9:50 a.m. (5 minutes)
Oval Office

Dick Celeste requested this short meeting during a telephone conversation with you. The purpose of the meeting is to give Dick an opportunity to discuss very briefly the accomplishments of the Peace Corps under his directorship and his concerns for its future.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

18 dec 80

The Vice President

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12/17/80

Mr. President:

Two requests for today:

- 1) Charlie Masters from Savannah is in town and has asked to say hi
___ approve disapprove
- 2) Jen0 Paulucci and group return today from the earthquake tour in Italy and would like to report on their trip. The VP is most anxious for you to do this.
 approve ___ disapprove

*after they meet
✓ VP*

Phil

J
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12:55 pm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Meeting with Nolan Atkinson and Family
Thursday, December 18, 1980
The Oval Office
12:55 p.m.
(3 minutes)

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(by: Michael Grant)

I. PURPOSE:

Brief meeting and photograph with Nolan Atkinson and his family

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS:

A. Background: Atkinson is a black attorney in Philadelphia who has been our major political contact there for the last five years.

You have probably met him in receiving line situations in 1976 and over the past four years.

He was the organizer of the 1976 Black Steering Committee and was an invaluable asset to the reelection campaign.

B. Participants: The President
Nolan Atkinson
Elizabeth Atkinson - wife who is 8 months pregnant
Emily Atkinson - daughter, 6 years old
Norrell Atkinson - daughter, 3 years old

C. Press: White House Photographer

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


December 18, 1980

To Bernice Renn

It is with special thanks that I congratulate you on your retirement from government service. During those 30 years you have faithfully served seven Presidents in your capacity as a member and then Chief of the Presidential Appointments Staff of the Department of State. You have executed your additional, historic responsibility as the "Keeper" of the Great Seal of the United States conscientiously and with distinction.

As you leave your position at the Department, you may be sure that you have my best wishes for every future success and happiness.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

Mrs. Bernice C. Renn
Chief
Presidential Appointments Staff
Department of State

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1980

JACK WATSON
ARNIE MILLER

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 16, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JACK WATSON *Jack*

ARNIE MILLER *AM*

SUBJECT:

Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
Designation of Chairman

The CAB Chairman is designated annually. In addition to providing policy direction, the Chairman serves as the chief administrative officer of the agency. Marvin Cohen's term as Chairman expires December 31. Cohen, who has served as Chair since 1978, has worked hard to ensure the smooth implementation of airline deregulation, and has been particularly attentive to small and mid-sized communities whose service has been effected. He has been an articulate spokesperson for our policies, both at home and internationally. We recommend that he be redesignated Chairman.

The Reagan transition team has requested that you not designate a Chairman before the Inauguration. However, the precedent for making the designation has been firmly established. Presidents Ford, Johnson, Eisenhower and Truman all designated CAB Chairmen before leaving office. If you do not designate a Chairman, there will be no agency head to make necessary, routine administrative decisions for at least 20 days. The statute does not authorize the approval of administrative actions by other Board Members or the General Counsel in the absence of a Chairman. A designation at this time will prevent potential legal challenges to administrative actions occurring in the absence of a Chairman, and ensure that the CAB continues to operate in a smooth and efficient manner.

Stu believes that the combination of the CAB leadership rapidly losing its top level staff and the possibility that particular interest groups will begin pushing for re-regulation of the airline industry could pose a serious danger to our deregulation policy. He strongly concurs with our recommendation that you designate Marvin Cohen for another one-year term as Chairman.

RECOMMENDATION

Designate Marvin Cohen to be Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, for a term expiring December 31, 1981.

approve

disapprove

MARVIN COHEN
Arizona

EXPERIENCE

1978 - Date	Chairman Civil Aeronautics Board
1976 - 1978	Secretary Arizona Legal Services
1975 - 1977	Chairman Group and Prepaid Legal Committee Arizona State Bar
Since 1973	Associate Bilby, Shoenhair, Warnock & Dolph, P.C.
1961 - 1963	Special Assistant to the Solicitor Department of the Interior Washington, D. C.
1961	First Assistant City Attorney City of Tuscon
1959 - 1960	Chief Civil Deputy Pima County Attorney
1958	Deputy Pima County Attorney
1957	Associate Udall & Udall

EDUCATION

1957	University of Arizona, LL.B.
1953	University of Arizona, B.A.

PERSONAL

White Male
Age 49
Democrat

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

18 dec 80

Stu Eizenstat

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
your information.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9

December 18, 1980

Mr. President,

As a personal note, I would urge you to provide an additional \$300 million in economic aid to the State of Israel, so that the total aid your Administration provides would be \$2.5 billion.

Stu
Stu Eizenstat

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Rick Hutcheson

The attached was returned in
Mrs. Carter's outbox. It is
being forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Madeline MacBean

12-17-80

(out box, 12/16/80)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President,

Thought you
might enjoy this
one.

JSS

than bureaucratic efficiency, and then to
ize freely not only the way in which the
sidency was organized but also its rela-
ships with the Congress.
The study was initiated, with the endorse-
ment of President Carter and former Presi-
dent Ford, before the primaries began and

and to deal with economic, political, and
international affairs, and a small secretariat to
help ensure their constant, informal, and in-
conspicuous coordination. Even greater em-
phasis is put on the need to strengthen the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, not only to
give the president objective advice and help

more disciplined organization within the Con-
gress, capable of tough bargaining with the
president, would actually help him discipline
and control the executive departments in a
responsible manner.
Cabinet members, the first budget direc-

*Don K. Price, former dean of Har-
vard's Kennedy School of Government,
was co-chairman of the panel that pro-
duced "A Presidency for the 1980s."*

*CS Monitor
12/15/80*

The bias that Carter encountered

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By Godfrey Sperling Jr.

Washington
Jody Powell was indicating the other day
he felt the President had been pretty
handbagged by his foes in Washington
the North. He didn't quite say so, but it
clear that Powell saw much of Jimmy
Carter's trouble in the presidency as stem-

Washington letter

ing from the unfriendly climate which he
encountered here and which persisted and
worsened with his years in the White House.
Powell is both wrong and right. President
Carter promised he could and would make
government work. He did, but only in part,
not enough to convince the voters he had
ruled another four years.
When a president makes such a promise,
cannot later say that this or that factor pre-
vented its fulfillment. Implied in a presiden-
candidate's commitment (certainly as it
is interpreted by press and public) is that

he has taken all possible negative factors into
account.

But Powell is right about the unfriendly
climate. Much of it was simply anti-Southern,
anti-Georgian, and anti-Southern country
people. It came mainly from Northern city
dwellers, many of them from minority groups
who, undoubtedly without sensing it, were ex-
pressing a bias against those in the United
States who have long suffered from post-Civil
War prejudice.

Reporters first noticed this anti-Carter
feeling at the New York convention in 1976
where New Yorkers were giving only grudg-
ing backing to the new Democratic standard
bearer. There was no wild excitement about
Carter. Instead, there was widespread suspi-
cion about this man who came from the South
and, more than that, was so deeply involved
in his Southern Baptist religion.

Even when reassured that Carter was a
"liberal" and courageous in dealing with civil
rights questions, these New York Democrats,
predominantly Jewish or Roman Catholic,
still remained cool to the Georgian. Because

of this reticence toward Carter, Gerald Ford
almost won New York that fall.

Among the minorities in the North (except
the blacks) and among the liberals in general
President Carter never was accepted. They
treated him as a stranger, and their suspicion
never let up.

These skeptics were particularly irritated
by the President's avowals of deep faith. They
sometimes laughed at his disclosure of having
been "born again" and his daily prayer and
his regular church and Sunday school activ-
ity. They never seemed to understand how
genuinely committed the President was to his
religion. Instead, they would make out Mr.
and Mrs. Carter to be sanctimonious and even
hypocritical.

So it was that, when Senator Kennedy de-
cided to rally the liberals in a crusade to
unseat the President, he found them coming
behind him immediately — and eagerly.

Certainly some of this zeal to oppose Car-
ter stemmed from the feeling that the Presi-
dent had not done enough in support of social
programs. And certainly, too, Democratic

liberals don't need much prodding to get be-
hind a Kennedy for president. But when you
talked to these liberals you found something
else — this suspicion, this prejudice, centered
on where Carter came from, on where he
went to church, and on his deep involvement
in his religion. Some of the very people who
have suffered so much from bigotry through
the years were, again unknowingly, express-
ing a kind of bigotry against the President.

Billy Carter helped to underscore the
Northern-held concept of the President and
his friends as coming out of Dogpatch. Put
Billy Carter in a Northern big city and the
liberals would quickly excuse him, perhaps as
being ill or eccentric. But there was little
sympathy from liberals for Billy even after it
was disclosed he was being treated for alco-
holism.

So Jody Powell had it right, or mostly
right. His President didn't get entirely a
square deal here in the North. He was treated
with suspicion, and unfairly so.

*Godfrey Sperling Jr. is chief of the
Monitor's Washington bureau.*

Handwritten initials and a checkmark.

OPINION AND COMMENTARY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

dec. 18 80

Lloyd Cutler:

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 17, 1980

Lloyd -
Please advise
J

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: THOMAS L. FARMER ^{TLF}
Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board
SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight Board Transition Issues

For two reasons, the Intelligence Oversight Board feels it necessary to request a ruling from you personally on the matter of the disposition of its records. First, the Board reports to you "directly and exclusively." Second, there is a history on this subject established by previous Administrations with respect to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), which is the direct ancestor of the IOB. That history, going back to the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition, indicates that all Presidents since that time have viewed the Board as a non-partisan and continuing body and have, therefore, maintained all of the Board's original papers intact in the White House. All of the PFIAB records from the Eisenhower Administration through its abolition in 1977, and all of the IOB records since its creation during the Ford Administration, are currently maintained in the IOB offices.

The Board also requests your advice concerning transition team access to IOB documents before January 20, 1981.

I. Disposition of IOB Documents

With respect to the disposition of IOB documents, we would initially like to ascertain which categories of documents you want transferred to your Presidential Library.

The documents that would seem to be of greatest historical interest are IOB reports to you and records of your decisions on reported matters. The Board's files also contain reports received from intelligence agencies, IOB staff "work product," and records of official IOB actions other than meetings with or correspondence to you.

We would appreciate being advised whether you wish transferred to Georgia:

— Only IOB reports to you and records of your decisions on reported matters.

- All documents except reports received from intelligence agencies and IOB staff "work product."
- All documents received or generated by the IOB during your Administration, without exception.
- Other.

We urge that, in line with established precedent, you authorize the retention of originals of all IOB documents at their present location in the EOB, with copies of those documents you want for your Library transferred to Georgia. In the alternative, originals could be transferred to Georgia with copies retained in the Board's files for the next Administration.

We found the complete IOB files from the Ford Administration -- including IOB reports to President Ford and his replies thereto -- to be extremely valuable in preserving institutional continuity and building upon the experience of our predecessors. The Board's files are the only comprehensive source of information about the intelligence oversight process within the Executive Branch. We therefore recommend that the Board's files be retained intact to conform to past precedent and enable new White House oversight officials to build upon our experience and acquired knowledge during the past four years.

In line with the above, we request your instructions as indicated below:

- Retain at IOB originals/copies of all documents transferred to Georgia.
- Retain at IOB originals/copies of all documents transferred to Georgia except IOB reports to you and records of your decisions on reported matters.
- Do not retain originals or copies of any documents transferred to Georgia.
- Other.

II. Transition Team Access to IOB Documents Before January 20

Separate questions are raised by a recent request by the Reagan transition team for access to virtually all IOB documents, including and especially IOB reports to you, before January 20, 1981.

During the 1976-77 transition period, the IOB Counsel created new documents that described the role and general responsibilities

of the IOB at the request of transition team personnel. Oral descriptions were also provided of the generic categories of intelligence activities considered by the Board. The Ford Administration IOB, however, did not provide incoming Administration personnel access to any "raw" IOB documents. It is our understanding that the NSC is currently following a similar procedure.

We agree with these precedents. In general, we do not believe that transition personnel -- especially those who have not been designated as senior officials in the new Administration -- need to review existing IOB documents in order to address the institutional issues of primary interest during the transition period.

We therefore propose that no existing IOB documents or information concerning specific intelligence operations considered by the Board be made available to transition personnel except as follows:

-- That a classified, oral briefing on the Board's activities during the past four years be provided by the IOB Chairman to appropriate individuals designated as senior appointees in the new Administration (such as the Vice President-elect or the DCI-designate) who have the requisite security clearances and "need to know";

-- That a copy of the IOB's December 4, 1980, report to you on its activities during your Administration be made available for review in the IOB's office by such senior appointees with no copy removed from our office; and

-- That unclassified versions of the introductory and "recommendations" sections of the December 4, 1980, report subsequently be provided to transition personnel. The introductory section simply describes the institutional role of the IOB in the Executive Branch oversight system. The "recommendations" section contains four general recommendations concerning the Board's institutional role and one general recommendation concerning the covert action review and approval process.

We believe that this procedure adequately balances the new Administration's need for informed decision-making on the institutional issues they must address and the equally compelling need to preserve the security and confidentiality of classified IOB documents.

Recommendation approved.

Other.

